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Abstract
‘Income management’ programs, restricting the way in which some 
recipients of government transfers can spend this money, have operated 
in Australia since 2007. The nature of the programs implemented varies 
considerably, including the mix of voluntary and compulsory elements, and 
differences in the scope and nature of targeting. A number of evaluations 
and other studies of these programs have been made. The methodologies 
of these have varied, as has the specific set of subprograms they have 
studied; some have mainly relied on the perceptions of participants and 
various stakeholders, and a smaller group has focused on seeking to 
measure and report actual changes in behaviour and outcomes over time. 
This has led to an apparent diversity of findings that has been exaggerated 
by selective use in public debate. The largest and most in-depth evaluation 
of income management was the evaluation of New Income Management 
in the Northern Territory. This found that the program had not achieved its 
objectives and appears to have created dependence. The relative findings of 
the studies are considered. 
Keywords: Income Management, Indigenous Australians, 
conditional welfare, social policy, program evaluation. 
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Acronyms and glossary
AIHW Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
ANU Australian National University
APY Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara. The APY Lands 
encompasses 13 communities in the far north-west of South 
Australia.
BasicsCard The main way in which income-managed funds are made 
available. An EFTPOS card that can be used at approved 
merchants.
Centrelink The Australian Government agency responsible for delivering 
income support and other government payments and 
programs, including income management. It is part of the 
Department of Human Services.
CLC Central Land Council. CLC provides a number of services for 
the benefit of traditional owners and other Aboriginal residents 
of the CLC region, which covers the southern half of the 
Northern Territory.
CPIM Child Protection Income Management
CPSIM Child Protection Scheme of Income Management. ORIMA 
Research used this term to refer to CPIM.
DHS Australian Government Department of Human Services
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DSS Australian Government Department of Social Services 
(formerly FaHCSIA)
EFTPOS Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale
FaHCSIA Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. Renamed DSS 
on 18 September 2013.
FRC Family Responsibilities Commission. FRC plays an important 
role in the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial, including referring 
people to income management where this is judged to be 
appropriate. 
GBM Government business managers. Australian Government 
officials placed in a remote community, as part of the NTER, 
to assist in managing and coordinating initiatives.
humbug A term used with a variety of meanings, including to hassle, 
or to refer to a problem or difficulty. It is often used to refer to 
unreasonable and excessive demands from family and others. 
In the context of income management, it tends to refer to this 
latter taking the form of significant financial harassment. 
IM Income Management
Intervention  The NTER is commonly referred to as ‘the Intervention’.
NG Ngaanyatjarra. The NG Lands encompass 12 communities in 
the central far east desert region of Western Australia.
NIM New Income Management. Income management introduced 
in the Northern Territory in August 2010 to replace the earlier 
NTERIM. Today the program is usually just called Income 
Management in the Northern Territory.
NTER Northern Territory Emergency Response. A set of policies 
introduced by the Australian Government in June 2007.
NTERIM Income management as part of the NTER and operating from 
September 2007 to late 2010. The program was applied to 
people on income support living in prescribed Indigenous 
Communities in the Northern Territory.
PBIM Place-Based Income Management. A form of income 
management that operates in five disadvantaged locations. 
The program commenced in July 2010.
VIM Voluntary Income Management
VULN-AT Vulnerable Income Management Automatic Trigger. Refers in 
the PBIM evaluation to that group of young persons on this 
measure because of being in receipt of a specific payment.
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1 Introduction
Constraints on the way in which some recipients of government transfer payments can spend this 
financial assistance have been a feature of Australian 
social policies since 2007. The largest program seeking 
to implement these policies has been New Income 
Management (NIM) in the Northern Territory. This 
program was introduced in 2010 and has mainly impacted 
on Indigenous Australians. 
A major evaluation of this program was undertaken 
between 2010 and 2013. This found that the program has 
not achieved the outcomes it had sought. Specifically, the 
evaluation reported (Bray et al. 2012, 2014ab) that there 
was an absence of any pattern of measurable positive 
impact across a wide range of behavioural and outcome 
measures for most participants, in particular those 
on the compulsory measures, and some indications 
that, rather than building capacity and self-reliance, 
the measure had made people more dependent on the 
welfare system. While there was a mix of views about the 
program by participants, program administrators and 
others, including some perceptions of outcomes having 
improved, these were not sustained when actual change 
was studied.
On the release of the evaluation, the then Australian 
Government Minister for Social Services stated, ‘some 
of the findings are disappointing and seem to be 
inconsistent with more positive findings from evaluations 
of income management in other sites’ (Andrews 2014a). 
The objective of this paper is to review the body of 
evaluations of, and related research into, income 
management to identify the extent of consistency across 
these studies and, where there may be variation, the 
reasons why.
In this analysis, a number of themes emerge. The first 
is that the nature of the different income management 
programs that have been implemented in Australia is 
quite diverse. While some effectively impose compulsory 
income management1 in a relatively untargeted manner, 
using broad criteria such as duration on income support 
across a large proportion of income support recipients, 
other initiatives are tightly targeted at people with specific 
problems and identified needs. Although most people 
subject to the program have had the measure imposed 
on them, a significant minority have chosen to participate 
on a voluntary basis.2 In some initiatives, people subject 
to income management have had the program imposed 
as part of a coordinated package of measures, including 
a range of supports; in others it stands in isolation. 
These and other differences in program characteristics 
are likely to result in different outcomes for participants 
and, to the extent that different evaluations have been 
directed at specific measures, and hence differences in 
participant characteristics and circumstances, it would 
be anticipated that a range of findings may emerge. 
The second theme is that a wide range of different 
approaches have been adopted in the evaluations and 
studies. Some focus on the perspectives of program 
managers and other intermediaries; others primarily use 
qualitative measures of the perceptions and views of 
participants. A more limited number, including the NIM 
evaluation, consider changes in actual behaviours and 
outcomes relative to the program objectives.
The third, and most critical, is that, when account is 
taken of these factors, there is in fact a considerable 
amount of consistency in the findings of the evaluations. 
These include that there are mixed views about the 
program among both participants, program managers 
and other intermediaries. These views include some, at 
times strong, positive perceptions by some people on 
the program of changes in behaviour and outcomes. 
However, those studies that seek to identify such 
changes through direct measurement, such as using 
repeated surveys which record individual behaviours 
and outcomes, and the use of administrative records, 
spending, consumption, or broader community 
outcomes data, find little or no effect. To the extent that 
the policy has any beneficial effect, this seems to be 
limited to those who have chosen to go on in a voluntary 
capacity, or where the program is tightly targeted to 
very high-needs individuals as part of an integrated 
package of interventions. Even here, the overall impact 
is small, and these gains are not experienced by those 
placed on broadly targeted compulsory measures. A 
recurrent thread across many of the evaluations is the 
absence of any evidence of improvements in individual 
financial management capacity and the potential 
role of the program in increasing dependence on the 
welfare system.
A possible explanation of the perception of 
‘inconsistency’ in the findings of the NIM evaluation 
lies in the selective way in which the results of the 
various evaluations have been cited in public debate, 
in particular by the Australian Government, including 
successive ministers. 
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2 Background
The Australian Government first introduced income 
management as part of the social security system in 
2007.3,4 The policy seeks to control the way in which 
certain people can spend a portion of the income they 
receive from income support and related government 
transfer payments. The initial implementation of the 
policy comprised two programs: the widespread 
imposition of income management in identified 
Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, as a 
major component of the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response (NTER); and a much more targeted form of 
income management, as one of a range of strategies 
that could be used as part of the case management of 
some people identified as having adverse outcomes 
in the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial. Since then, the 
application of income management policies has been 
extended, and the original Northern Territory Emergency 
Response Income Management (NTERIM) program has 
been replaced by ‘New Income Management’ (NIM) in the 
Northern Territory.
Over the eight years since its initial introduction, the 
policy has been subject to a number of evaluations. 
The largest of these was the evaluation of New Income 
Management in the Northern Territory. This evaluation 
was commissioned by the Australian Government 
Department of Social Services (DSS) (at the time the 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services 
and Indigenous Affairs [FaHCSIA]) and undertaken, 
after a competitive tendering process, by a consortium 
of researchers from the Australian National University, 
the Australian Institute of Family Studies and UNSW 
Australia. The consortium presented two major reports 
(Bray et al. 2012, 2014a) and a brief summary of the final 
report (Bray et al. 2014b).5 The second of these reports 
summarised the findings of the evaluation, in terms of 
the outcomes that it had achieved relative to the program 
objectives, as:
A wide range of measures related to consumption, 
financial capability, financial harassment, alcohol 
and related behaviours, child health, child neglect, 
developmental outcomes, and school attendance 
have been considered as part of this evaluation … 
Despite the magnitude of the program the evaluation 
does not find any consistent evidence of income 
management having a significant systematic positive 
impact. (Bray et al. 2014a:316)
The report further concluded: 
Indeed, rather than promoting independence and 
the building of skills and capabilities, New Income 
Management in the Northern Territory appears to 
have encouraged increasing dependence upon the 
welfare system, and the tools which were envisaged 
as providing people with the skills to manage have 
rather become instruments that relieve them of the 
burden of management. (Bray et al. 2014a:320)
The report did, however, observe that there was some 
evidence, mainly from intermediaries,6 that pointed to a 
potential for the use of an income management approach 
in a small number of cases where it was introduced as 
part of a range of interventions in a more managed and 
individualised approach:
There is some evidence to show that income 
management may be a successful intervention when 
used as part of an individually tailored program for 
some individuals who have been specifically targeted 
as a result of their identified individual vulnerability 
or problem such as child protection. The evidence 
is that some people within this group can use it as 
an effective tool, including to stabilise their situation 
while other initiatives seek to address underlying 
problems. However, taken as a whole, there is no 
evidence to indicate that income management 
has any effects at the community level, nor that 
income management, in itself, facilitates long-term 
behavioural change. (Bray et al. 2014a:320)
It was also noted that:
While there are some individuals, in particular those 
who chose to go on the voluntary stream, who find 
income management a useful tool and say that it has 
produced benefits for them, there is no systematic 
evidence of this generating change that can be 
identified across the income managed populations 
and the communities they live in as a whole. 
(Bray et al. 2014a:18)
2.1 Australian income management programs
Currently, the Australian Government has 12 income 
management initiatives in place. In March 2016, 
26 508 people were being income managed. However, 
because specific program details are not available for this 
date, March 2015 data are used in this review to describe 
existing program arrangements7 (Table 1). As at 27 March 
2015, 25 663 income support recipients were subject 
to the measure. The overwhelming majority of these, 
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80.5%, were in the Northern Territory, primarily on the 
two compulsory measures targeted on the basis of the 
duration of receipt of income support: Long-Term Welfare 
Payment Recipient and Disengaged Youth, referred to 
collectively as Compulsory Income Management.
Just over 10% of those on income management in 
March 2015 were on five ‘place based’ initiatives, with 
a further 2.9% on the program in Perth and 3.4% in the 
Kimberley. Each of the other four initiatives accounted for 
less than 1% of the number of people on the program. 
Of the non–Northern Territory population, 47.5% were on 
Voluntary Income Management, mainly in the Kimberley 
region and in Perth; and 41.2% were on an automatic 
youth trigger, mainly in the place-based initiatives. With 
the exception of the place-based initiatives, where 82% 
of participants were non-Indigenous, the overwhelming 
majority of people subject to the measure were 
Indigenous Australians.
Under most of the income management subprograms, 
income management is applied to half of the person’s 
income support payments, including family payments, 
and all of any lump-sum payments. The proportion of 
income that is quarantined is higher for those on the child 
protection subprogram, at 70%, while the Cape York 
program has provision for variable proportions.
Funds subject to income management are mainly 
allocated to a BasicsCard. This is an EFTPOS card that 
can be used at approved merchants who have, among 
other criteria,8 agreed not to sell alcohol, tobacco, 
pornography, or gambling services and products to a 
person as part of a BasicsCard transaction. The cards 
cannot be used to make cash withdrawals or purchase 
some near-cash substitutes such as gift cards. In 
addition, a person subject to income management can 
arrange for Centrelink9 to make payments on their behalf 
for approved purchases and services, including housing.
Persons who volunteer to be on income management 
have been eligible for an additional payment of $250 for 
every 26 weeks they are on the program.10
2.1.1 NTERIM and Cape York
The initial two income management programs in Australia 
were NTERIM and income management as part of the 
Cape York Welfare Reform Trial. These were markedly 
different from each other in scope and in the process 
by which people were determined to be subject to the 
measure. NTERIM was introduced as part of the NTER 
(also known as the Intervention) as one of a wide range 
of different programs and policies described as ‘broad 
ranging measures to stabilise and protect communities 
in the crisis area’ (Brough 2007).11 The program applied 
to all people who were in receipt of income support 
and lived in Indigenous communities in the Northern 
Territory which had been prescribed in legislation. These 
prescribed areas encompassed an estimated 70% of the 
Northern Territory Aboriginal population (Yu et al. 2008) 
and covered some 500 Indigenous communities. Initial 
roll-out of the program commenced in September 2007; 
in July 2010, about 16 900 people were on the program.
In contrast, the Cape York initiative, which began in 
July 2008, is a highly targeted approach. People are 
only subject to income management after a referral – 
for example, because of child neglect, or poor school 
attendance by their children, or from a magistrate in a 
court proceeding – and are required to appear in front 
of the statutory Family Responsibilities Commission, 
the members of which include a legally qualified 
Commissioner, and which case manages individual 
clients. The commission reported in September 2014, 
‘Since the commencement of the Commission 1462 CIM 
[Compulsory Income Management] orders inclusive of 
original orders, extensions and amendments have been 
made relating to 655 clients’ (FRC 2014:10). At the time of 
this report, just 222 people were subject to compulsory 
income management. In the same report, the commission 
indicated that, although it considered it important to 
have income management as a resource, there was 
also value in people being ‘afforded the opportunity to 
be initially conferenced and reminded of their personal 
and communal responsibilities’ (FRC 2014:13). The 
report indicates that just over 40% of the people it has 
dealt with have been placed on income management, 
although all the people who have appeared before it have 
been referred because of school attendance issues, or 
magistrates’ court or child safety and welfare notices. 
2.1.2 New Income Management in the Northern 
Territory
NIM was introduced in 2010 to replace NTERIM. A key 
motivation for introducing NIM in 2010 was to maintain 
income management, but to do so in a way that would 
enable restoration of the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cwlth), which had been suspended to enable 
the earlier program to be specifically imposed on 
Aboriginal communities. The new program, in addition 
to applying across all of the Northern Territory, differed 
from NTERIM in a number of ways. It no longer applied 
to all income support recipients, but rather was limited 
to those on a number of specified programs – including 
Youth Allowance, Newstart and Parenting Payment – for 
more than three months for those aged under 25 years 
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and more than a year for those above this age. The 
Northern Territory is the only significant location which 
has this form of widespread, nontargeted income 
management. The program also introduced Voluntary 
Income Management for those not subject to compulsory 
measures, as well as a number of additional targeted 
compulsory measures. These measures included Child 
Protection Income Management for people who have 
been referred by the Northern Territory child protection 
authorities, the Supporting People at Risk (SPAR) 
stream for people referred by the Northern Territory 
Alcohol Mandatory Treatment Tribunal, and Vulnerable 
Income Management. Placement on Vulnerable Income 
Management was initially based on referrals by DSS 
social workers and focused on people with significant 
self-management and related problems, but since 
September 2013 this subprogram has been dominated 
by an automatic youth vulnerable measure which is 
directed at young people in receipt of particular forms of 
income support.12
In addition, NIM had scope for some exemptions for 
people who could provide demonstrated evidence 
of responsible parenting activities, or substantial 
employment. These exemptions have largely flowed to 
non-Indigenous women with children living in Darwin. In 
December 2013, whereas 36.3% of the non-Indigenous 
population potentially eligible for Compulsory Income 
Management had an exemption, the proportion of the 
Indigenous population with an exemption was 4.9%.13
As indicated in Table 1, despite the expansion of the 
program, income management in the Northern Territory 
accounts for four out of five people currently on income 
management in Australia, although only 1% of the 
Australian population lives in the Northern Territory. 
TABLE 1. Income management population, by initiative and program type, 27 March 2015, and 
25 March 2016 summary data
Income 
management 
initiative 
(27 March 2015)
Program element
Compulsory
Child 
Protection 
(CPIM)
Vulnerable
Supporting 
People at 
Risk
Voluntary 
(VIM)
Long-Term 
Welfare 
Payment 
recipient 
Disengaged 
Youth 
Social worker 
referrals 
on income 
mangement
Auto – 
youth 
trigger Total
Northern Territorya 11 963 4 279  68 178 449 194 3 524 20 655
Cape York – –  –  –  –  –  – 153
Perth – – 165  –  –  – 573 738
Kimberley – – 115  –  –  – 760 875
APY Lands – – <20 <20  – 213 230
NG Lands – – <20 np  – 182 213
Ceduna – – <20 np  – 40 61
Place based
Bankstown – – 22 114  – 37 173
Greater 
Shepparton – – <20 140  – 211 365
Logan – – <20 865  – 170 1 044
Playford – – <20 485  – 114 608
Rockhampton – – 21 448  – 79 548
Total – March 2015b 11 963 4 279 420 239 2 512 194 5 903 25 663
Total – March 2016c 13 097 4 393 333 250 2 622 198 5 478 26 508
– = absence of participants; APY Lands = Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Lands; CPIM = Child Protection Income Management; 
NG Lands = Ngaanyatjarra Lands and Laverton Shire; np = population too small to be released by Centrelink; VIM = Voluntary Income Management
a This was previously known as NIM, and is still referred to as NIM in this paper.
b The total number of people on the Child Protection Income Management and the Social Worker Assessed Vulnerable Income Management elements 
in 2015 is based on the 2016 distribution of participants, because the split between these programs is not available in the published data for some of 
the initiatives.
c The Department of Social Services appears to have stopped publishing detailed statistics at the program level. Total includes 137 on income 
management under the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial.
Source:  Modifed from DSS (2015a, 2016a)
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In December 2013, 90.2% of those subject to NIM 
identified as Indigenous. Across the Northern 
Territory, it is estimated that about 1.3% of the non-
Indigenous population aged 15 years and over is on 
income management as opposed to 34.0% of the 
equivalent Indigenous population. This is a function of 
the differences in rate of receipt of income support, 
with 11.0% of the Northern Territory non-Indigenous 
population aged 15 years and over receiving income 
support, compared with 53.2% of the equivalent 
Indigenous population, and the proportion of income 
support recipients subject to income management, 
which was 11.7% for non-Indigenous recipients in the 
Northern Territory as opposed to 63.9% for the Territory’s 
Indigenous recipients (Bray et al. 2014a:73).
The introduction of NIM was proposed as a first step 
of a wider implementation of income management 
in a ‘nondiscriminatory’ manner. This was detailed in 
the government’s major policy statement, ‘Landmark 
reform to the welfare system, reinstatement of the Racial 
Discrimination Act and strengthening of the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response’:14
The Government is moving to introduce landmark 
reforms to the welfare system which, over time, will 
see the national roll out of a non-discriminatory 
scheme to income manage welfare payments in 
disadvantaged regions across Australia. (Australian 
Government 2009:1)
2.1.3 Place-based initiatives
The five place-based initiatives, introduced in July 
2012 in line with the above policy, were described as 
part of a strategy to ‘tackle entrenched disadvantage’ 
in 10 locations as part of the 2011–12 Budget initiative 
Building Australia’s Future Workforce (BAFW) (Australian 
Government 2011). In this context, these locations 
were seen as part of a ‘patchwork economy’ in which 
economic opportunities were poorly distributed. To 
address this, a package of measures was introduced, 
including early intervention programs for jobless families 
and additional funding ‘to deliver integrated local services 
and a Local Solutions Fund for innovative projects that 
provide new services and models to boost engagement 
and participation’ (Australian Government 2011:28). The 
10 areas were identified on the basis of ‘numbers of 
jobless families, youth unemployment rates, the level 
of income support dependence, and the length of time 
recipients have been on income support’ (Australian 
Government 2011:28).
In five of these locations – Bankstown (New South Wales), 
Greater Shepparton (Victoria), Logan (Queensland), 
Playford (South Australia) and Rockhampton 
(Queensland) – the package of measures included 
the introduction of a form of income management: 
Place-Based Income Management. The initiatives 
were described as ‘trials’ in the context of the 2009 
proposal, noted above, to roll out the new form of income 
management more widely. Although initially developed 
in the context of the BAFW policy, Place-Based Income 
Management appears to have lost association with the 
other elements of this broader initiative, which has now 
effectively been terminated.
Unlike NIM, Place-Based Income Management does not 
have widespread compulsory income management as 
part of its program structure. The program comprises 
three streams of income management: Child Protection, 
Vulnerable and Voluntary. The vulnerable measure 
contains the same two components seen in the Northern 
Territory: social worker assessments and automatic 
measures directed at youth. As shown in Table 1, the 
majority of participants currently on the program are 
young people who have been subject to an automatic 
assessment as being vulnerable – with this being, in most 
cases,15 because they qualify for an income support 
payment at a higher rate, as it has been determined that it 
is unreasonable for them to live at home. Eligibility for this 
higher rate of payment is usually as a result of extreme 
family breakdown, health risk or an inability of parents 
to provide stable accommodation. Very few appear to 
have been placed on the program because they were 
individually assessed as being vulnerable. 
Just over 22% of the population on this subprogram 
have volunteered for income management, with 
this number largely driven by the 57.8% of Greater 
Shepparton participants who have done so. The 
balance of participants is a very small group on the child 
protection measure.
2.1.4 Other initiatives
The other five initiatives are based in South Australia and 
Western Australia. In Western Australia, this comprises 
programs in the Perth metropolitan and Peel regions, 
in the Kimberley region (both of which commenced in 
November 2008), and in the Ngaanyatjarra (NG) Lands 
and Laverton Shire (commenced in April 2013). In South 
Australia, in addition to the place-based initiative in 
Playford, there are initiatives in Ceduna16 (since July 2014) 
and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands 
(since October 2012). As detailed in Table 1, participation 
in these latter two initiatives is overwhelmingly Voluntary 
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Income Management, followed by people placed on Child 
Protection Income Management. Although the vulnerable 
measure is part of the program in the NG Lands, the 
APY Lands and Ceduna, both on the basis of individual 
assessment and automatically for some youth on the 
basis of the payments they receive, it is not an element of 
the other Western Australian initiatives, which involve only 
Child Protection and Voluntary Income Management. 
In August 2015, the government announced an expansion 
of Child Protection Income Management and Voluntary 
Income Management in the Greater Adelaide region of 
South Australia, following a coronial recommendation 
(Morrison 2015). This program commenced in October 2015. 
An allied measure, a Cashless Debit Card Trial, which 
seeks to reflect the approach recommended in the 
Forrest review (see Section 3.4.11), commenced in early 
2016. The scheme is to operate in up to three locations, 
with a cap of 10 000 participants.17 The program involves 
restrictions on 80% of the income support payment of 
all recipients other than Age Pensioners and those on 
veterans’ payments, with these funds being paid through 
a debit card that cannot be used for the purchase 
of alcohol, for gambling or for cash withdrawals.18 
The government has announced that there will be a 
detailed and independent evaluation of the program 
(Tudge 2015).19
2.2 Objectives of income management
The current20 legislative objectives of income 
management include: 
... to reduce immediate hardship and deprivation by 
ensuring that the whole or part of certain welfare 
payments is directed to meeting the priority needs … 
to ensure that recipients of certain welfare payments 
are given support in budgeting to meet priority 
needs … to reduce the amount … available to be 
spent on alcoholic beverages, gambling, tobacco 
products and pornographic material … to reduce the 
likelihood that recipients of welfare payments will be 
subject to harassment and abuse in relation to their 
welfare payments; to encourage socially responsible 
behaviour. (Social Security [Administration] Act 1999 
[Cwlth], s 123TB)
More generally, the purpose of the policy has been 
articulated as laying ‘the foundations for pathways 
to economic and social participation’ (Australian 
Government 2009:5), to ‘deliver on the Government’s 
commitment to a welfare system based on the principles 
of engagement, participation and responsibility’ (Macklin 
& Snowdon 2009) and ‘to foster individual responsibility 
and to provide a platform for people to move up and out 
of welfare dependence’ (Macklin & Snowdon 2009).
Although described in a positive role in the above 
statements, in some cases the program appears to 
be conceived of as also acting as a punitive sanction. 
This is particularly the case with the Cape York income 
management, which is described as a program that ‘acts 
both as a means to ensure financial stability for families 
and as an incentive for the individual to engage with 
support services and observe behavioural obligations’ 
(FaHCSIA 2012:8). This role in Cape York is further 
elaborated as: 
The trial design envisages that measures to 
encourage people to change their behaviours as 
a result of compliance (e.g. the FRC’s legislative 
sanction of income management or the prospect 
of being shamed at an FRC conference). 
(FaHCSIA 2012:28)
3 Income management evaluations 
and related studies
The impact of income management has been the subject 
of a number of evaluation studies and academic- and 
community-based analyses. In addition to studies 
specifically focused on income management, a significant 
body of research and evaluation is also associated with 
the Intervention in the Northern Territory, of which income 
management was one part. 
Altman & Russell (2012) examined this latter set of studies 
and reported that by the end of October 2012 they had 
identified 98 ‘government and independent reports that 
might be defined as monitoring, auditing or reporting the 
Intervention’ (Altman & Russell 2012:8). This study raised 
significant questions about the role of evaluation in the 
policy development of the Intervention and, more broadly, 
in government Indigenous policy, and concluded: 
Given such a political impetus behind the 
Intervention, evaluation becomes another technique 
of governmentality and an obfuscating tool. 
Evaluation in the context of the Intervention then has 
been effectively divorced from the issues it seeks to 
assess. (Altman & Russell 2012:19)
Some of the issues associated with this critique are 
discussed in Section 5.2; however, the wider set of 
issues raised by Altman and Russell across the activities 
undertaken in the Intervention, and the broader reach of 
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the studies they consider, are largely beyond this paper. 
The focus here is on specific research and evaluation 
relating to income management, and the findings that 
emerge from this.21 
3.1 Some issues
In considering the evaluations and other studies of 
income management, two factors need to be borne in 
mind. The first is that there is considerable variability 
across the studies in their scope, methodology and 
rigour. The second is the range of different forms of 
income management that have been implemented. 
This includes whether or not people are compelled to 
be subject to the measure, or have chosen to go onto 
the program, and whether this is because they believe 
it may be of benefit to them; whether they have been 
on an earlier compulsory program and have simply 
remained on; or whether they have responded to financial 
incentives. In addition, there are differences in the extent 
to which the compulsory programs are tightly targeted 
at those with individually identified specific needs, or are 
applied to a much wider population without regard to 
individual circumstances. These factors are considered 
in more detail below and have considerable implications 
for how the evidence from evaluations of income 
management should be weighed up. 
3.1.1 Methodology
A wide range of different methodologies have been 
adopted in the research studies. Only two – the evaluation 
of NIM by the Social Policy Research Centre at UNSW 
Australia, the Australian National University and the 
Australian Institute of Family Studies consortium, and the 
Deloitte evaluation of Place-Based Income Management 
– can be considered as large-scale formal program 
evaluations, with systematic, although somewhat limited, 
attempts to obtain control groups22 and collect data on 
a longitudinal basis. A significant number of the projects 
have undertaken consultations with, and collected data 
from, program participants and a range of intermediaries. 
The latter include people directly involved in the delivery 
of the program and those engaged in providing services 
to people subject to income management – including 
specialist services – in addition to more general providers 
such as stores. A smaller number of studies, including 
the NIM evaluation, have supplemented the use of this 
type of impressionistic information by looking at actual 
changes identified in administrative and other data, 
including store sales. In contrast, some of the studies 
included here have not undertaken their own primary 
research but have drawn on secondary sources, and 
expert and other submissions.
The evaluation of NIM placed considerable emphasis on 
the principle of triangulation in drawing its conclusions. 
The rationale for this approach was explained as: 
… the broad evaluation methodology involves 
drawing together findings from a wide range of 
sources in order to identify common and consistent 
trends and outcomes, and by means of this process 
of triangulation verify the robustness of the findings. 
(Bray et al. 2014a:41)
This approach to triangulation applied in several ways: in 
using data from multiple sources, in using both qualitative 
and quantitative material, and in assessing the consistency 
and significance of apparent outcomes derived from these 
various sources. That is, the researchers did not take any 
one individual result as representative of an outcome, but 
rather sought to identify whether there were consistent 
patterns of change across associated measures and 
across populations, or, where these were not present, to 
identify a rationale for this. This approach was adopted to 
ensure robustness and avoid the ‘cherry picking’ of results 
from a diverse set of outcomes.
Some of the reasons for this approach were highlighted 
in the first report of the NIM evaluation, which discussed 
the large differences that were observed in the study 
between the perception of change as reported by 
program participants and the actual changes that could 
be identified in these people’s lives over the period in 
which they were income managed. As documented in 
the first report (Bray et al. 2012:196), the researchers 
noted that, while some groups reported in response to a 
direct question significant improvements over the period 
of income management in their perceived capacity to 
purchase food, this perception was not sustained in 
the analysis of other data in the survey that recorded, 
for the same person, the incidence of having run out of 
food prior to, and while on, income management (Bray 
et al. 2012:196). Similarly, the report noted that, while 
many people reported positive perceptions of change 
in child outcomes, including school attendance, these 
perceptions were at odds with other data such as school 
attendance data (Bray et al. 2012:214). The final report 
documents the discussion of this type of contradictory 
evidence in a feedback session that was held with a 
community following the release of the first report. 
It notes: 
In feedback we were told ‘what else do you think we 
would say – it would be a shame job if we said things 
had got worse for our children – and if we did, what 
would happen? Would the government take them 
away again?’ (Bray et al. 2014a:168)
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This response emphasises not just the extent to which 
participant survey responses are at risk of the usual 
forms of social desirability bias,23 but indeed a level of 
angst among some respondents about the consequences 
if ‘nondesirable’ outcomes are reported.
These methodological issues need to be borne in mind 
when considering the results of other studies, especially 
those that rely extensively on self-reports of change.
3.1.2 Nature of the programs evaluated
As discussed above, the nature of the income 
management programs implemented varies. In some 
locations, Voluntary Income Management has dominated 
participation, while other programs have elements of both 
voluntary and targeted measures. In some programs, 
placement on the measure occurs automatically based 
on criteria related to income support status. In contrast, 
in others – for example, the Cape York program – it only 
occurs after a detailed process involving the participation 
of the person to whom the measure may apply. It is only 
in the Northern Territory that widespread compulsory 
income management – under both NTERIM and NIM – 
has been applied.
It is reasonable to expect that the different characteristics 
of these programs would have differing impacts on the 
achievement of program outcomes. For example, it may 
be considered that those who choose to be subject to 
the program will be more motivated to use the program 
to improve their outcomes. Similarly, where a person is 
assessed as being vulnerable by a caseworker or other 
person who is involved in providing a range of other 
interventions to support the person, it is possible that the 
impact of the program, as part of an integrated case-
management approach, would be quite different to simply 
being placed on the measure with no other interventions. 
It is equally likely that targeted approaches (i e. that 
involve assessing a person and determining their need 
to be income managed because of their circumstances 
and outcomes) will have quite a different impact to where 
people are placed on the measure based on very general 
criteria (such as their duration of receiving the payment), 
without regard to their actual capacity to manage and the 
outcomes they achieve.
Given the different characteristics of the programs that 
have been implemented, considerable diversity could be 
expected in the findings of different evaluation studies. 
Consequently, findings of an evaluation related to one of 
the program elements should not be extrapolated to other 
forms of the program.
In this regard, it is noted that no single evaluation fully 
encompasses all forms. While the evaluation of NIM is 
the most comprehensive – reporting on Compulsory, 
Vulnerable (both assessed and automatic), Child 
Protection and Voluntary Income Management – it does 
not address the specific form of community assessment 
used in Cape York. The scope of all of the other 
evaluations is much more limited.
3.2 Formal evaluation studies
Income management, and the broader policy 
environment in which it was developed, especially as 
part of the NTER, has been the focus of considerable 
formal program evaluation. Eight of these evaluations are 
discussed below. 
3.2.1 Report on the NTER, NTER Review 
Board, 2008
The NTER Review Board produced a major review of the 
Intervention and made extensive recommendations across 
many aspects of the policies that had been implemented 
as part of the Intervention, as well as the way in which this 
implementation had occurred. With respect to income 
management, it recommended that the NTER program 
of income management should cease and be replaced 
by a voluntary program, and that compulsory income 
management should ‘only apply on the basis of child 
protection, school enrolment and attendance and other 
relevant behavioural triggers’, and that it be applied across 
the whole of the Northern Territory (Yu et al. 2008:12).
The report noted that in the testimony presented to it 
many people spoke in support of the program, believing 
that it had produced positive results, but, most frequently, 
the board was told that people felt that there should be 
an opportunity to go onto the program voluntarily, along 
with a targeted scheme for those who demonstrate they 
are not meeting family and community responsibilities (Yu 
et al. 2008:21).
The board concluded its discussion of income 
management by emphasising the need for a much more 
integrated approach to the problems that it was targeted 
at, indicating:
However, it was emphasised that income 
management should be seen as only one element of 
a suite of measures which should include financial 
literacy, banking, home management and child 
welfare and protection services designed and 
implemented in partnership with the communities. 
(Yu et al. 2008:21)
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More generally across the range of initiatives, the 
board emphasised a need for governments to ‘reset 
their relationship with Aboriginal people based on 
genuine consultation, engagement and partnership’ 
(Yu et al. 2008:12).
3.2.2 Evaluation of income management in the 
Northern Territory, Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2010
This report was prepared by the Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare (AIHW) using data which had already 
been collected by the then FaHCSIA for evaluation of 
the program; AIHW indicates that FaHCSIA ‘had primary 
responsibility for this income management evaluation. 
The department developed the evaluation approach 
and methodology, and managed the data collection 
process’ (AIHW 2010:v). In addition to the post-licensing 
monitoring report (see Section 3.4.4) and the perceptions 
of intermediaries, especially the Australian Government 
‘government business managers’ who had been 
placed in a number of the more significant Indigenous 
communities to coordinate government programs, the 
major source of empirical data was a survey undertaken 
by the Cultural & Indigenous Research Centre Australia 
of 76 people on income management, and qualitative 
data collected in focus groups and other forums with 
167 participants.24 In its report, AIHW (2010), while 
presenting a range of outcomes which would appear 
to be positive, in areas such as consumption, and 
community and child wellbeing, expressed a number 
of cautions about the evaluation, noting it would ‘sit 
towards the bottom of Leigh’s evidence hierarchy’ (AIHW 
2010:16) and that ‘it was difficult to separate the effects 
of income management from the effects of the other 
measures’ (AIHW 2010:16). AIHW also indicated that the 
findings were ‘dependent on the perceptions and views 
of various stakeholders (clients, store owners, GBMs 
[government business managers], community groups, 
Centrelink staff) about whether there had been changes 
due to income management’ (AIHW 2010:16) rather than 
the actual measurement of outcomes and changes in 
these over time. This led AIHW to conclude ‘the overall 
evidence about the effectiveness of income management 
was not strong’ (AIHW 2010:16). Notwithstanding these 
reservations, this report has continued to be cited as a 
key source of information about outcomes.
Specific findings of the report included that ‘there 
had been improvements in child wellbeing since the 
introduction of income management’ (AIHW 2010:vii), 
along with children appearing to be healthier. It also 
reported improvements in community wellbeing, including 
a reduction in financial harassment, gambling, drinking 
and domestic violence. The report further indicated 
that ‘three-quarters of clients interviewed … reported 
spending more on food, with half … buying more fruit and 
vegetables’ (AIHW 2010:vii), and that ‘more than two-
thirds of store operators reported an increase in sales of 
fruit and vegetables and healthy food’ (AIHW 2010:vii). 
Although the report indicated that ‘more than half of the 
clients surveyed reported spending less on cigarettes’, 
it also noted that ‘the majority of store operators who 
answered the question reported that cigarette sales were 
unchanged’ (AIHW 2008:vii).
3.2.3 Evaluation of the Child Protection Scheme 
of Income Management and Voluntary Income 
Management measures in Western Australia, ORIMA 
Research, 2010
This was an early evaluation of the initial income 
management programs in Western Australia. These 
comprised Child Protection Income Management and 
Voluntary Income Management. The results of later 
research into programs in Western Australia are discussed 
in Section 3.2.6. The study used quantitative data 
collected in a survey of 88 participants and a control group 
of 61. It also had an online survey of 132 intermediaries 
and qualitative interviews with 17 community leaders, and 
access to a range of administrative data. 
The executive summary of the report indicates that:
The evaluation found that CPSIM and VIM were 
effective measures in helping people meet their 
priority needs and those of their children. Evidence 
provided by IM clients, Centrelink staff, DCP 
[Department for Child Protection – Western Australia] 
staff, financial counsellors, money management 
advisers, welfare/community organisations and 
community leaders was consistent and indicated 
that both measures had delivered significant positive 
impacts in relation to child and family wellbeing. 
The evaluation found some evidence of a positive 
impact of the measures on the financial management 
capabilities of participants, but this was not as 
conclusive as the evidence in relation to child and 
family wellbeing. (ORIMA Research 2010:17)
The study did, however, report that a:
… longer-term risk around the IM programs identified 
by stakeholders was that some IM clients may become 
dependent on the system and not take personal 
responsibility because of the view that their money is 
being managed for them. (ORIMA Research 2010:17)
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This study was subject to criticism by the Western 
Australian Council of Social Service, which discussed 
a range of issues with the study, including technical 
aspects of the survey and the high standard errors. It 
concluded that:
The positive subjective feedback about the two 
income management programs should not be 
dismissed. The tone of the report, however, does 
tend to minimise some of the more negative 
responses and focuses on affirming qualitative 
data to support the programs intended outcomes. 
(WACOSS 2011:14)
3.2.4 NTER evaluation report, Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs, 2011
This evaluation report (FaHCSIA 2011) was prepared 
by the Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs (now the Department 
of Social Services). The report is an edited volume 
which draws together 10 chapters which had been 
commissioned by the department from a range of 
authors. The report covers the breadth of the NTER 
initiatives over its first four years, and encompasses both 
NTERIM and NIM.
The chapter on welfare reform and employment 
concluded that:
… the evidence collected to date suggests that the 
welfare reforms may have strengthened communities, 
making them more sustainable and safer, particularly 
for women and children. Income management may 
also have contributed to healthier children who have 
more access to food. There is also some evidence 
of improvements in community wellbeing, with 
less humbugging and less cash being available for 
gambling, cigarettes and substance abuse, as well 
as more spending by families on priority goods. 
(FaHCSIA 2011:362)
In large part, the evaluation drew on existing material, 
in particular the AIHW study described in Section 3.2.2, 
and the Community Safety and Wellbeing Research 
Survey (see Section 3.4.5). This was particularly the 
case in the chapter on welfare reform and employment, 
which contained the main discussion of income 
management. This chapter, prepared by Colmar Brunton, 
indicates ‘the research for this chapter used a desktop 
methodology involving a review of 63 documents to 
inform the evaluation of welfare reform and employment 
measures’ (FaHCSIA 2011:335). The conclusion of this 
particular chapter, as presented in the key findings, was 
somewhat tentative:
There is some evidence suggesting welfare reform 
had some positive effects, such as strengthening 
communities and making them more sustainable 
and safer, particularly for women and children. 
However, given the limitations of the evaluations 
and consultations conducted to date, further 
research is necessary to confirm these findings. 
(FaHCSIA 2011:333)
The extent to which the material in the report reflected 
substantive evaluation activity varied across the chapters. 
In some cases, the material would appear to be more akin 
to anecdotal reporting, with little evaluative content. This 
tendency is particularly apparent in the overview chapter, 
which presents statements such as ‘income management 
was supported by many people in the communities who 
believed that it was bringing about positive outcomes, 
especially for children’ (FaHCSIA 2011:6). Similarly, in the 
case of people transitioning from NTERIM to Voluntary 
Income Management under NIM, the report says ‘some 
participants have been able to save for and purchase 
major household items, such as washing machines or 
new refrigerators’ (FaHCSIA 2011:32). Although this 
type of qualitative observation provides some valuable 
insights, where it is used to deepen an understanding of 
the actual outcomes, in the absence of such a framework 
it is much less informative and open to selective 
presentation. In addition to this type of anecdote being 
drawn from material other than that presented in the 
detailed evaluation chapters, despite the fact that this 
was an overview chapter, the chapter lacks any of the 
cautious notes apparent in more detailed considerations.
Harris (2011) critiqued this evaluation, citing a ‘noticeable 
absence of any in-depth traditional insights to the issues 
under analysis’ (Harris 2011:1) and exploring aspects of 
the methodology of a number of the data collections it 
used. She concluded:
The Evaluation has filled in many of the gaps in the 
story, while it has highlighted that many of the claims 
of success made by the Federal Government, are far 
from being evidence-based and are exaggerated. 
(Harris 2011:13)
3.2.5 Cape York Welfare Reform Evaluation, 
Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2012
As with the NTER evaluation report detailed in 
Section 3.2.4, this evaluation report (FaHCSIA 2012) 
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comprised a series of chapters commissioned by the 
department on different aspects of this initiative with 
a range of different authors. The Department of Social 
Services (at the time FaHCSIA) then brought these 
together with overview and summary material. The scope 
of the report goes well beyond income management, 
which is only one element of the Cape York Welfare 
Reform Trial. The model of income management used 
in the trial is quite distinctive. It uses a highly targeted 
approach25 based on individual assessment of the 
appropriateness of the policy for the person by the 
Family Responsibilities Commission. It also operates 
as part of a case management approach in seeking to 
work with individuals, and within this framework income 
management has a duality as both a tool and a sanction. 
These characteristics mean that much of the benefit of the 
evaluation is in what it tells us about the use of different 
approaches, rather than extrapolating its findings more 
widely as being the impact of income management. 
Overall, the evaluation reported that income management 
imposed and managed by the Family Responsibilities 
Commission had been a successful element of the 
welfare reform trial which had led to a better meeting 
of the needs of families and children. There was some 
evidence, in some locations only, that the policy may 
have impacted more widely on behaviour, with the report 
indicating some changes in the number of notices (for 
various adverse behaviours), specifically: 
... there are some indications that being placed on 
income management by the FRC was more likely 
to be associated with subsequent lower rates of 
notification for residents of Hope Vale and Coen 
than it was in Aurukun or Mossman Gorge, but there 
was no overall significant difference in the number 
of notices per quarter before and after being income 
managed. (FaHCSIA 2012:209)
The question of the specific role of income management 
in achieving the changes was, however, more difficult to 
determine, with the report noting that: 
… the evidence suggests that the impact of the local 
FRC Commissioners is in their listening, guiding 
and supporting role, rather than in the exercising of 
their punitive powers to order income management. 
(FaHCSIA 2012:50)
Similarly, Katz and Raven (2013:21) indicated that the 
commission’s ‘support and guidance’ made an important 
contribution to improvements in child outcomes outside 
any potential impact of any income management it may 
have imposed.
The evaluation did, however, find some suggestion of 
dependence, and that the policy was less effective, or 
even potentially counterproductive, where people sought 
to avoid its impact on them: 
The data indicate that some community members 
had become habituated to income management 
or had found ways around it. This appears in some 
cases to have produced unintended consequences, 
such as clients on income management harassing 
relatives for access to alcohol or drugs. It appears 
that for this group income management (and welfare 
reform more generally) has little effect. (FaHCSIA 
2012:212)
Finally, the evaluation again stressed the extent to 
which this model differed from other forms of income 
management in the extent of its targeting and in the 
monitoring and case management of individuals – with 
the latter being a significant contributor to the outcomes.
The Cape York model has also been subject to a review 
by the Queensland Parliament Health and Community 
Services Committee. The committee reported:
The committee is confident that the FRC is 
satisfactorily performing its statutory functions.
It is more difficult for the committee to assess 
whether the FRC’s role is one that is effective 
in contributing to the original rationale for 
its establishment …
To restore social norms, responsible behaviour 
and local authority, the committee considers that 
a holistic approach and long term government 
support is necessary; significant social change is not 
achieved from short term initiatives. This is complex 
and challenging welfare reform, which requires more 
than the conferencing and income management 
provided by the FRC. Change must be fostered 
across years and across generations. Communities 
must be engaged, policy makers must be prepared 
to listen and to try diverse and innovative approaches 
that will be accepted by the communities in which 
they are to be implemented. (Ruthenberg 2014:18)
The committee also reports that in its consultations 
‘stakeholders stated that family members often share 
cards and that the goods purchased with BasicsCards 
can be readily traded in “culturally sanctioned reciprocal 
sharing of alcohol and tobacco”’ (Ruthenberg 2014:8).
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3.2.6 A review of Child Protection Income 
Management in Western Australia, Department of 
Social Services, 2014
This research, undertaken within the Australian 
Government, but with an external advisory group, 
used a combination of case file reviews, interviews and 
focus groups with 149 intermediaries, and interviews 
with 22 current and 10 former Child Protection Income 
Management participants. As has been discussed, it is 
the second study to examine the impact of initiatives in 
Western Australia. The review made findings with respect 
to both processes and the impact of the program. It 
did, however, caution that the review relied simply on 
qualitative data and that ‘care should be taken in drawing 
conclusions, as the findings cannot be generalised’ 
(DSS 2014a:71).
The review reported that intermediaries ‘overwhelmingly 
reported that income management had assisted 
recipients to meet their priority needs and those of their 
children’ (DSS 2014a:14). However, the assessment by 
participants was less clear. For this group, it was reported 
that ‘of the 32 income-managed recipients interviewed, 
10 commented on having more food and clothing for their 
children’ (DSS 2014a:50). It further reported that around 
half of respondents indicated that they were better able 
to budget, and a similar proportion that they liked having 
payments made automatically on their behalf. Around a 
third of the participants said they wanted to remain on. 
Of the balance who said they wanted to get off, half said 
they did not want anything more to do with the program, 
while the others, although wanting to exit, wanted an 
option to return if they wished. 
In terms of the wider impact, the review concluded: 
In relation to the ability of Child Protection Income 
Management to promote socially responsible 
behaviour, the findings were more varied. 
Intermediaries thought that income management was 
effective in helping to reduce financial harassment 
or humbugging and reducing the amount of money 
available for alcohol and drugs. However, families 
generally experienced multiple problems and needed 
a holistic approach to support them, with income 
management being one component. (DSS 2014a:71)
While not raising the issue of dependence, the report 
noted the concerns of a money management provider 
that ‘they’re not learning from it. It’s getting done for 
them; do you know what I mean? Money is being 
managed for them. They’re not learning from it’ (DSS 
2014a:56).
When compared with the previous evaluation of the same 
program, this review would suggest a somewhat less 
positive outcome, although again there was no evidence 
of actual changes in outcomes.
3.2.7 Place-Based Income Management, 
Deloitte, 2015
This evaluation was conducted between July 2012 and 
May 2015. Four reports were produced: an initial baseline 
evaluation report (Deloitte 2014a), a process and short-
term outcomes evaluation report (Deloitte 2014b), a 
medium-term outcomes evaluation report (Deloitte 2015a) 
and a consolidated Place-Based Income Management 
evaluation report (Deloitte 2015b). The evaluation used 
diverse data sources, including a longitudinal survey of 
participants and a control population. The first wave of 
the survey had 458 Place-Based Income Management 
participants and 457 in the comparison group (Deloitte 
2015b:22). Other sources of data included qualitative 
data from participants and stakeholders,26 and 
administrative records.
As detailed in Table 1, most participants (74.9%) in Place-
Based Income Management have been placed on income 
management because of the automatic youth trigger, 
although this varies by location. The program also differs 
from other initiatives in that most participants are non-
Indigenous.
The evaluation noted that the population that had chosen 
the voluntary program were, on the basis of their survey 
responses about their behaviours and experiences, 
assessed by the researchers to be more financially 
vulnerable than those placed on because of their 
assumed vulnerability (Deloitte 2014b:91).
As with a number of the evaluations, the study found that 
a significant group reported some positive perceptions 
of outcomes, with 24.4% of those on the voluntary 
measure and 17.6% of those on the vulnerable measure 
reporting that the payment of bills on time was the 
main way the program had impacted on them (Deloitte 
2015b:27). Looking at self-reported money management 
outcomes, the report identified a positive and significant 
improvement for those on the vulnerable measure across 
the longitudinal survey,27 but no significant change 
between the baseline and the final survey for those who 
were compulsorily placed on the vulnerable program. 
This was also the case with respect to the questions on 
having sufficient money to last until ‘pay day’, running out 
of money to pay bills and running out of money to pay 
rent. Neither group reported any significant improvement 
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in running out of money to pay for food relative to the 
control population. 
Turning to specific behaviours, there was no significant 
change in the incidence of smoking, although those on 
the voluntary measure reported a significant decline 
in the number of cigarettes consumed. There were no 
significant changes in the incidence or level of drinking, or 
the incidence of gambling. The study found no significant 
difference in the incidence of homelessness, although 
this was qualified by possible attrition in the survey. 
Taking these results as a whole suggests that the group 
on Voluntary Income Management may have experienced 
some improvement in their ability to manage money, 
but not with respect to outcomes such as running out 
of money for food, or gambling or alcohol consumption, 
and, while the incidence of smoking has not changed 
significantly, the level of tobacco consumption has 
been reduced.
The report summarises the major results, differentiating 
between those on the voluntary measure and on the 
compulsory vulnerable stream,28 as:
… for VIM [Voluntary Income Management], 
participation in PBIM had a significant and positive 
impact on financial management capability. For 
example, over time, VIM customers were significantly 
less likely to run out of money before payday or have 
enough money to pay rent or mortgages. Further, VIM 
participants improved their confidence in both saving 
and spending over time. Such improvements were 
not noted for surveyed VULN [Vulnerable Income 
Management] customers over time …
The longitudinal survey did not find sustained, 
significant impacts on self-reports of smoking, 
drinking or gambling habits across any of the 
measures. (Deloitte 2015b:56)
The evaluation looked at a number of child outcomes, 
such as school attendance, and concluded that there 
was no evidence of improvement. In the short-term report 
the authors state: 
The simple interpretation of this finding is that PBIM 
does not appear to have had a significant impact 
on measures that reflect the wellbeing or care of 
children, such as attendance at school or health of 
children in the short term. (Deloitte 2014b:91)
In the final report, Deloitte indicated that, because 
of sample size, this analysis could not be repeated 
(Deloitte 2015b:42) in its medium-term study, but 
concluded that ‘the longitudinal survey did not find 
evidence of any direct improvements in the care or 
education of children for participants on any measure’ 
(Deloitte 2015b:iv).
The short-term evaluation also raised the question of 
whether people were developing a dependency on 
Place-Based Income Management (Deloitte 2014b:101). 
This was again identified in the medium-term report: ‘It 
was noted that one potential unintended consequence 
of the program could be a learned dependence on 
external financial management’ (Deloitte 2015a:91). More 
specifically, from focus groups with DSS staff it was 
reported, with respect to the vulnerable measure, ‘that 
the automatic triggers associated with this measure 
were selecting customers who were managing financially 
and found that income management was detrimental 
to their establishment of financial independence’ 
(Deloitte 2015b:53).
The Deloitte study concluded by suggesting a change 
in the program to orient it away from the widespread 
imposition of compulsory income management, 
maintaining instead a voluntary stream and a tightly 
targeted compulsory element: 
It is suggested that over time, the Department gives 
consideration to re-orienting the focus of measures to 
reflect the characteristics of the voluntary measure. 
That is, that over time, there is a lower reliance on 
compulsory mechanisms to engage consumers in the 
program unless there are exceptional circumstances 
at play. One way in which this could be achieved is 
to remove the automatic trigger for enrolment in the 
VULN-AT29 measure. (Deloitte 2015b:iv)
3.2.8 Voluntary Income Management in the APY 
Lands, Social Policy Research Centre at UNSW 
Australia, 2014 
This evaluation (Katz & Bates 2014) was a qualitative 
study that was mainly concerned with short-term effects. 
It only considered the voluntary element of the program in 
the APY Lands. As seen in Table 1, voluntary participants 
currently account for 92.6% of those on the measure 
in this location. It should be noted that the context of 
the program in the APY Lands differs from that in many 
other locations, because the program was introduced 
on the initiative of some community members and in 
consultation with the community.
While there were diverse views about the impact of the 
program, the evaluation reported that overall there was 
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a perception that the program had a positive, although 
limited, impact. This was manifest in terms of greater 
protection against financial harassment, although 
this problem persists, and participants felt better 
able to manage their money. There was, in general, 
considerable uncertainty among the study participants 
as to whether there had been any beneficial impact on 
food consumption and especially whether there was 
more or less food available for children. While the report 
noted that more people reported that child wellbeing had 
improved rather than worsened, the majority reported 
that they did not know whether the program had had an 
impact in this regard, and the researchers indicated that 
they could find no link between school attendance and 
income management.
Data collected by the evaluation identified deep 
and persistent deprivation and disadvantage in the 
community despite the implementation of income 
management, and the evaluation noted in its conclusion 
that, to the extent that some positives were found, 
‘changes in wellbeing are likely to have been brought 
about by a combination of programs and not solely as the 
result of income management’ (Katz & Bates 2014:41).
3.3 External scrutiny of operation 
of income management
A second strand of formal review of the program has 
concentrated on administrative aspects of the program. 
This includes three inquiries into aspects of the program 
by the Commonwealth Ombudsman and a review by 
the Auditor-General. While these bodies are primarily 
concerned with the administrative aspects of programs, 
and in the case of the Ombudsman the question of 
compliance with legislation and lawful and informed 
decision making, some aspects of program design and 
performance emerge. In addition, the program has been 
considered twice by the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Human Rights.
3.3.1 Ombudsman reviews
The Commonwealth Ombudsman has undertaken 
three inquiries into aspects of the operation of income 
management:
• Review Rights for Income Managed People in the 
Northern Territory, August 2010
• Review of Centrelink Income Management Decisions 
in the Northern Territory: Financial Vulnerability 
Exemptions and Vulnerable Welfare Payment 
Recipient Decisions, June 2012
• Administration of Income Management for ‘Vulnerable 
Youth’, February 2016.
The first inquiry (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2010) 
followed a complaint lodged with the Ombudsman, and 
related to the capacity of individuals to gain exemptions 
from NTERIM and, in particular, discrepancies between 
the claimed scope for review and the actual interpretation 
of this by the Social Security Appeals Tribunal.
The second inquiry (Commonwealth Ombudsman 
2012) was an own motion investigation into aspects of 
decisions relating to whether people should be placed 
on the vulnerable program in the Northern Territory 
and the operation of some aspects of exemptions. 
The review identified a number of administrative 
inadequacies, including with regard to compliance with 
legislation and the quality of communications, and made 
20 recommendations. Associated with this inquiry, which 
commenced in February 2011, was a marked decline in 
the number of people on the vulnerable program in the 
Northern Territory, from 243 in August 2011 to 133 in 
July 2012.
The third inquiry (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2016) 
followed receipt by the Ombudsman of complaints about 
the operation of the automatic vulnerable measure, in 
particular in Place-Based Income Management. A central 
concern of the Ombudsman was ‘the potential to result 
in IM being applied to people in circumstances where it 
could be detrimental to their wellbeing’ (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2016:5). The Ombudsman made 
10 recommendations, including removal of automatic 
extensions of vulnerable assessments.
While all of these inquiries were limited to the scope of 
the Ombudsman’s statutory responsibilities, a persistent 
theme in the findings was that income management had 
been implemented in a way that took limited account 
of individual needs, even where this was supposed to 
be part of the program design, and that systems and 
procedures were not sensitive to people’s circumstances. 
3.3.2 Administration of NIM in the Northern 
Territory, Auditor-General, 2013
This inquiry focused on a number of administrative 
aspects of NIM. The report contained two major 
recommendations relating to improved monitoring of, 
and reporting on, the program, including a performance 
reporting framework to measure the program’s 
effectiveness (ANAO 2013:26). While these were agreed 
by the department, there is little indication of actual 
implementation of policies in line with this commitment. 
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In the 2013–14 DSS annual report, for example, the 
only performance indicator is a table of BasicsCard 
spending (which appears to be a merchant type–based 
classification) which reports that 100% of funds are spent 
on ‘priority needs’30 (DSS 2014b:52). While there is a 
‘deliverable’ relating to the number of people on income 
management in the Portfolio Budget Statements (DSS 
2014c:99), there is no specific key performance indicator 
for the program.
The Auditor-General also made a number of key findings, 
including ‘there is an inherent risk that instead of 
developing budgeting skills, customers may come to rely 
on DHS [the Department of Human Services] and choose 
to remain on Income Management’ (ANAO 2013:68). 
It also noted that, while people could, under some 
circumstances, exit the program:
… this is not an explicit objective of the scheme and 
as a result there are no specific strategies in place 
to achieve this outcome. While some customers are 
likely to remain on Income Management indefinitely 
due to their personal circumstances, there are others 
who would benefit from a defined pathway to exit the 
scheme. This would be consistent with one of the 
overall aims of Income Management – to promote 
and support positive behavioural change and 
personal responsibility. (ANAO 2013:21)
3.3.3 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights is a 
cross-party and cross-House committee responsible for 
monitoring legislation for compatibility with human rights. 
It has conducted two inquiries into the Stronger Futures 
in the Northern Territory legislation, and reported in 2013 
(PJCHR 2013) and 2016 (PJCHR 2016).
In its first review, the committee did not make any specific 
recommendation on income management, although it 
noted that it did not consider that the government had 
made a sufficient case for the program to be seen as 
nondiscriminatory, or a justifiable limitation on the rights 
of individuals with regard to social security, family and 
privacy (PJCHR 2013:61–62). In its second review, the 
committee, drawing on submissions, correspondence 
with ministers, and the results of the evaluations of NIM in 
the Northern Territory, Place-Based Income Management 
and income management in the APY Lands, noted ‘the 
Committee is concerned that the income management 
regime is not rationally connected to achieving its 
objectives’ (PJCHR 2016:61). Further, in the context of its 
responsibilities, the committee expressed the view that: 
A human rights compliant approach requires that any 
measures must be effective, subject to monitoring 
and review and genuinely tailored to the needs and 
wishes of the local community. The current approach 
to income management falls short of this standard. 
(PJCHR 2016:62) 
Based on this, it concluded with a recommendation to 
remove the widespread imposition of compulsory income 
management with criteria such as duration, in favour of a 
strictly targeted approach: 
The committee recommends that income 
management should be imposed on a person only 
when that person has been individually assessed 
as not able to appropriately manage their income 
support payments. (PJCHR 2016:62)
3.4 Other research 
In addition to the formal evaluations of income management, 
aspects of the program have been considered in a wide 
range of studies and reviews. A selection of these is 
listed below, with an emphasis on those studies that have 
used additional primary material or have particular policy 
implications, including official policy reviews.
3.4.1 Reviewing the NTER: perspectives from six 
communities, Central Land Council, 2008
The Central Land Council undertook extensive 
consultations in six remote central Australian Indigenous 
communities in early 2008, including a detailed survey 
of 141 residents and 51 semistructured interviews. 
The research addressed a wide range of policies and 
programs associated with the NTER. In summary, the 
report concluded:
The overall picture is nuanced with support and 
opposition across the range of measures … The 
results from this work were diverse and community 
specific – each community is different. The rollout 
took no account of that. Where good governance 
structures and systems existed, they were ignored 
and undermined ... the impact of most NTER 
measures is modest and that the deeper social 
issues in communities remain unaddressed. 
(CLC 2008:7)
With specific reference to income management, the 
report noted:
Responses across survey participants were evenly 
divided between people in favour and opposed to 
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income management. Gender and age were not 
significant factors in influencing people’s level of 
support for income management … Advantages 
associated with income management included 
increased household expenditure on food and 
children, young men contributing to family 
shopping, and reductions in gambling and drinking. 
Disadvantages associated with income management 
included less discretionary cash and restrictions on 
the use of managed money, blanket coverage being 
discriminatory, problems with accessing managed 
money … Generally, there was some evidence that 
if income management was better directed towards 
people with alcohol, gambling or substance misuse 
problems, that people in communities would be more 
supportive of it. (CLC 2008:4–5)
The study also reported that ‘store figures from one 
store in Hermannsburg show increased expenditure 
on different food types with a reduction in cigarette 
purchases following the introduction of income 
management’ (CLC 2008:5). The data in the report 
suggested that sales of cigarettes in this store fell from 
$17 200 over a three-month period in 2007 to $11 200 
over the same period in 2008 (CLC 2008:36). 
3.4.2 Impact of income management on store sales 
in the Northern Territory, Brimblecombe et al., 2010
This research, headed by researchers from the Menzies 
School of Health Research (Brimblecombe et al. 2010), 
focused on the impact of NTERIM on purchases made 
in remote stores in Northern Territory Indigenous 
communities. The core finding was that: 
… income management appeared to have no effect 
on total store sales, food and drink sales, tobacco 
sales and fruit and vegetable sales … Soft drink 
sales and turnover dropped initially with income 
management, but increased thereafter.
These findings suggest that … income management 
may not affect people’s spending overall. The 
findings challenge a central tenet of income 
management – that people’s spending habits will be 
modified in a positive way with mandatory restrictions 
on expenditure. (Brimblecombe et al. 2010:552)
The researchers further discussed these findings relative 
to those of government-supported research which 
primarily relied upon store reports rather than detailed 
sales analysis, noting that the data did not provide 
support for claims of healthier food and drink purchases, 
and particular pointed to no impact on fruit and vegetable 
sales. They did, however, confirm the finding of this other 
analysis of there being no impact on tobacco sales. 
This research was subject to an aggressive response by 
FaHCSIA (FaHCSIA 2010:4–9) in which the department 
claimed, inter alia, that the stores were atypical and 
hence could not be used to draw any conclusions. 
Further, FaHCSIA suggested that simple arithmetic 
calculations arrived at different conclusions to the 
statistical analysis undertaken by the researchers which 
used more sophisticated techniques to control for store 
characteristics. Some of the criticism appears to be 
based on an apparently unpublished31 consultant’s 
report. 
3.4.3 Women’s experience of income management 
in the Northern Territory, Equality Rights 
Alliance, 2011
This research (Equality Rights Alliance 2011) describes 
itself as a ‘limited qualitative study of selected urban 
accessible groups’ (Equality Rights Alliance 2011:5) 
and not an evaluation of the wider impacts of income 
management. While describing itself as qualitative, it 
did collect some quantitative data, with 168 surveys 
being administered across the 183 women involved in 
the project. All of the participants were women with 
experience of income management, with 95% having a 
BasicsCard for more than a year. Most participants came 
from Alice Springs, including the town camps, with 96% 
identifying as Indigenous. Participants self-selected into 
the study, an approach that limits the generalisability of 
the findings and may introduce bias. Further, the study 
was reliant on self-reported outcomes and perceptions.
On balance, the results of this study were negative 
with respect to the need for, and effects of, income 
management. Almost all (97%) of women said they did 
not need help managing money, and 91% said income 
management had not made any difference to their family 
relationships, although 24% said it helped them look 
after their family better. A large majority, 85%, said that 
it had no impact on their shopping, although 22% said 
they saved money purchasing with BasicsCard, and 53% 
said it was often difficult to shop with BasicsCard. The 
majority said that they did not feel good using the card in 
big shops, and three-quarters felt they were not treated 
as nicely when using the card. Views on safety were split, 
with 70% saying they did not feel safer with the card, 
although 27% did. When asked if they wanted to stop 
using BasicsCard (i.e. stop being income managed), 79% 
said they wished to, whereas 20% said they were happy 
and wanted to keep using it. 
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3.4.4 Evaluation of the Community Stores Licensing 
Program, Cultural & Indigenous Research Centre 
Australia, 2011
One of the NTER initiatives was a licensing regime 
for community stores32 in the Northern Territory. This 
policy included requirements around the acceptance of 
BasicsCard, the range and quality of products available 
for sale, and the financial structure and practices of the 
store. The introduction of the licensing requirements was 
evaluated in 2011 (CIRCA 2011). The  valuation concluded: 
Overall stores licensing has had a positive impact on 
food security, in terms of ongoing access to food that 
is safe and of sufficient quality and quantity to meet 
household needs. (CIRCA 2011:36)
One particular aspect of the new licensing requirements 
was an elimination of the ‘book-up system’, which had 
seen many people perpetually in debt to their community 
store. While not addressing the outcomes of income 
management, this evaluation highlights the potential 
problem of attribution of changes identified in income 
management evaluations. That is, given there are many 
programs with similar objectives operating concurrently, 
trying to isolate the marginal contribution of each of these 
to any overall change in outcomes can be difficult. 
3.4.5 Community Safety and Wellbeing Research 
Survey, Shaw and d’Abbs, 2011
This project (Shaw & d’Abbs 2011) involved surveying 
1343 respondents in 17 remote Indigenous communities 
in the Northern Territory, with a key focus on collecting 
information on perceptions of change in the previous 
three years (i.e. since the Intervention).
The study reported on some very strong positive 
perceptions of change over the previous three years, 
with between 75% and 83% of respondents agreeing 
with the statements ‘School is better’, ‘Easier to get help 
from Centrelink’, ‘Easier to get help at clinic’, ‘Easier to 
get help from the police’, ‘Store is better’ and ‘More kids 
being looked after properly’. Around 70% agreed with 
the statements ‘Community is safer’ and ‘Community 
is working better together’, and around two-thirds, or 
just under, agreed with the statements ‘More respect 
for elders’, ‘Less people making trouble’, ‘Community 
leaders are stronger’, ‘Less drinking grog’ and ‘Less 
family fighting’ (Shaw & d’Abbs 2011:26).
The research also used a voting methodology in 
13 communities to identify what respondents considered 
to have been the most important changes in their 
communities, as well as the biggest challenges. The 
first-placed change was better policing, as a result 
of additional police and new stations. The second-
highest ranked change was better schools with more 
teachers and new facilities. The BasicsCard and more 
and better-quality housing were ranked as equal third 
(Shaw & d’Abbs 2011:32). The highest ranked challenge 
was housing, followed by jobs and training, and more 
activities for young people, which were ranked as equal 
second. In the executive summary, the report indicates: 
The majority of people judge that their life has 
improved over the last three years. Qualitative 
feedback offered with this judgment stresses that 
employment has been a major factor in improving 
individual’s lives. (Shaw & d’Abbs 2011:7) 
Notwithstanding this, the report summarises its 
findings as ‘a mixed picture of some triumphs and 
some seemingly intractable problems’ (Shaw & d’Abbs 
2011:134).
Tyler and Gibson (2011) criticised this study on a number 
of grounds. These included the specification of the time 
period over which people were reporting change, which 
they considered did not clearly demark the concept of 
changes that had occurred as a consequence of the 
Intervention; the extent to which the researchers tended 
to lead respondents; and a view that the consultants 
tended to simply report data from the survey at face 
value and claim this as substantive evidence of positive 
outcomes rather than placing it in context, including 
making use of other information that had been collected, 
to verify the validity of the results. As an example of the 
use of leading questions, they state, ‘Many questions 
clearly lead participants. The survey begins, for example, 
with 15 positive assertions that things have improved 
compared with “three years ago”’ (Tyler & Gibson 2011). 
They were also critical of the way in which the specific 
issues included in data collection, and reported on, 
tended to reflect a negative stereotype of Indigenous 
communities. The critique argued that, while in fact 
the data collected highlighted some of the core issues 
that were seen as being very important to the people 
living in the communities, such as culture, language 
and being close to family and friends, these were not 
substantively addressed. 
As to the alleged tendency to take some responses at 
face value, without testing them further – especially 
perceptions of apparent improvements – they cited two 
examples from the Shaw and d’Abbs report: school 
attendance and reporting on violence. In the case of 
school attendance, the original study reported: 
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Children’s level of activity, their school attendance, 
health and happiness are all seen to have improved. 
It is clear that in many communities respondents’ 
perception of increased school attendance is 
at variance with school attendance data, which 
record a decrease in attendance in some sites. 
(Shaw & d’Abbs 2011:6)
In the case of interpersonal violence, Tyler and Gibson 
referred to the caveat in the original report: 
Feedback from some data collectors suggested that 
a proportion of the ‘No’ (it is not OK to hit) response 
may have reflected the respondents’ desire to say the 
right thing, rather than their real opinions.  
(Shaw & d’Abbs 2011:120)
As pointed out by Tyler and Gibson, despite the need 
for some very strong qualifications on the perception 
data being indicative of actual change, given these 
types of contradictory evidence, and indeed grounds to 
consider the perceptions as being very weak evidence, 
this constraint appears to be ignored in the overall 
presentation of results in the Shaw and d’Abbs report. 
3.4.6 Impact on commercial gambling, Lamb and 
Young, 2011
Expenditure on gambling and gambling products is a 
nonapproved activity under income management. While 
much of the gambling takes place within communities, 
Hing and Breen (2014) reported that the ‘past 30 years 
of commercial gambling expansion has corresponded 
with growth in Indigenous gambling participation to levels 
well above those seen in the non-Indigenous Australian 
population’ (Hing & Breen 2014:2). In this context, the 
study by Lamb and Young (2011) considered the effect 
of income management under the NTER on commercial 
gambling in Alice Springs and Katherine using outlet-
level data on spending on electronic gaming machines 
(EGMs). The research drew a tentative conclusion that 
‘the Intervention has appeared to reduce the cash 
availability for EGM gambling, although this effect is 
difficult to separate from a range of localised spatial, 
social and temporal variables’ (Lamb & Young 2011:135). 
The authors indicated, however, on the basis of their 
mixed results and the limitations of their technique, that 
further research is required, and placed an emphasis on a 
need for ‘locally-sensitive policies formulated jointly with 
Aboriginal interest groups’ (Lamb & Young 2011:136).
3.4.7 Income management in Mäpuru, 
Puszka et al., 2013
This was a study of the implementation of income 
management in a small Northern Territory Indigenous 
community between September 2008 and September 
2009. As indicated from the dates, this was during the 
operation of NTERIM, and the study documents particular 
problems for the community as a result of problems 
with the stores’ licensing. Individuals reported increased 
problems with having to manage three separate income 
streams (non–income support income, income-managed 
funds and non–income managed income support), and 
operational issues associated with balance checking and 
the complications in use of income-managed funds for 
purposes such as travel. The study reported no change 
in alcohol consumption, although a ‘reduced capacity 
to purchase cigarettes’ (Puszka et al. 2013:63) was 
identified. Other than this, the study reported that there 
was no change in consumption behaviour and concludes, 
‘Our research conflicts with the findings of government-
conducted research suggesting that income management 
resulted in increased availability of food’ 
(Puszka et al. 2013:67). 
A strong theme which emerged from the study was the 
impact of the top-down implementation of the program. 
In addition to the specific issues of the operation of the 
local store, there was a ‘perpetuation of disengagement 
and marginalisation’, which was seen as setting back ‘the 
actualisation of residents’ aspirations for self-sufficiency 
and self-management’ (Puszka et al. 2013:69). 
3.4.8 Compulsory Income Management and 
Indigenous Australians: delivering social justice or 
furthering colonial domination, Bielefeld, 2012
In this academic paper, Bielefeld (2012) placed income 
management in the context of historical policies in 
Australia that limited the access of Indigenous people to 
money, including their own earnings from employment. 
She argued that income management is a continuation 
of colonial-era and later policies of domination and 
surveillance. Specifically, she noted that this paternalistic 
approach exacerbates the trauma experienced by 
Indigenous peoples and results in their disempowerment. 
In concluding, she emphasised the need for policy 
to take account of the needs and aspirations of 
Indigenous people, and noted, citing a range of different 
consultations with Indigenous communities about income 
management, that there may be scope for a purely 
voluntary model that would appear to have some support 
by communities. These concerns are further developed in 
Bielefeld (2014ab).
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3.4.9 Challenges in evaluating Indigenous policy, 
Malezer, 2013
In 2012, the Productivity Commission held a roundtable: 
Better Indigenous Policies: the Role of Evaluation. In his 
presentation to this roundtable, Les Malezer, Co-Chair of 
the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, spoke 
on the challenges of evaluation in Indigenous policy 
(Malezer 2013). Although not specifically addressing 
the question of income management, the paper directly 
addressed the question of the nature of these evaluations 
and their findings. Specifically, he spoke about how the 
outcomes measured in evaluation are, in most cases, 
framed from the perspective of governments and, more 
generally, mainstream non-Indigenous society, and as a 
consequence neglect to take account of the needs and 
priorities of Indigenous people themselves. In discussing 
the Closing the Gap targets, he stated:
These are important indicators, endorsed by 
Australian governments. But they do not address 
other important needs of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. For example, they do not 
address the legacies of historical injustice, such as 
stolen wages, the stolen generation, stolen territories, 
the need for development, and the pursuit of culture 
and identity by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples. Consequently, there is a disregard for 
the essential needs of self-determination through 
governance, decision-making, law and Indigenous 
peoples’ own institutions. (Malezer 2013:77)
3.4.10 Community perspectives on income 
management, Ceduna and region, Ninti One, 2013
This study (Abbott et al. 2013) was commissioned by 
the Australian Government prior to income management 
in Ceduna. The study was based on interviews with 
204 people in the region, around three-quarters of 
whom identified as being Indigenous. It reported that 
58% of respondents knew something about income 
management, including 25% who knew of someone 
they thought had been on the program. The survey 
identified a wide range of problems, including substance 
abuse, unemployment and health, and reported that 
this indicated: 
… the complexity of issues that people face, many 
of which are likely to compound and reinforce 
each other. The most obvious examples are grief, 
alcohol use and unemployment, a combination not 
uncommon in many communities in Australia and 
worldwide. (Abbott et al. 2013:38)
The study reported that: 
… many participants (up to 89%, depending on 
the question) reported that their own financial 
management practices are satisfactory and enable 
them to meet their essential needs, implying 
disagreement with uniform and compulsory Income 
Management. (Abbott et al. 2013:5)
At the same time, this was not necessarily a rejection of 
the concept, with 58% responding that they felt there 
were other people they knew who would benefit (Abbott 
et al. 2013:21). Survey respondents reported a range 
of improvements they saw as potentially flowing from 
income management, but also a range of other problems 
they saw as being unaffected or worsening.
3.4.11 The Forrest review, Forrest, 2014
The Forrest review33 was commissioned to ‘provide 
recommendations to ensure indigenous training and 
employment services are targeted and administered to 
connect unemployed indigenous people with real and 
sustainable jobs’ (Abbott 2013). The review drew on 
extensive consultation and formal submissions, as well 
as research by a secretariat; it did not undertake primary 
data collection. Among the recommendations in its report 
‘Creating parity’ (Forrest 2014) the review proposed 
introduction of a Healthy Welfare Card34 which would 
replace and extend income management.
In coming to this recommendation, the review noted that:
Income management was widely regarded as very 
helpful for vulnerable people, enabling them to 
manage their budgets, save for expenses and stay 
in stable housing. However, it is complex, it can 
be considered paternalistic and comes with a cost 
that renders it unsustainable and unsuitable for 
broader application.
While income management is useful to stabilise an 
individual’s circumstances, it can make transitions off 
welfare and into work more difficult. (Forrest 2014:27)
The review observed that income management ‘is very 
expensive for the government to administer and it has 
some stigma associated with it for the recipient’ (Forrest 
2014:102). The report also addressed the question 
of financial capacity. It called for the introduction 
of ‘culturally relevant financial management and 
mentoring [which] could address gaps in the provision of 
financial … assistance and support to first Australians’ 
(Forrest 2014:105).
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As noted earlier, in 2016 the government commenced 
trials of a cashless debit card in response to the 
recommendations of this review.
3.4.12 Report of the Reference Group on Welfare, 
McClure, 2015
The Reference Group on Welfare Reform35 was 
established by the Minister for Social Services ‘to identify 
improvements to ensure the system is sustainable, 
effective and coherent, and encourages people to work’ 
(McClure 2015:5). As with the Forrest review, it relied 
primarily on consultations, submissions and research 
undertaken by a secretariat. With respect to income 
management, it concluded that the program ‘should be 
used judiciously and should be delivered in conjunction 
with financial capability and other support services’ 
(McClure 2015:24). Central to the reference group’s 
concerns was that the ultimate focus of the program 
needed to be on helping ‘people to develop the skills 
to become financially self-reliant’ (McClure 2015:114) 
and that this was not currently the case. In particular, 
it indicated:
Stakeholders working closely with people on income 
support said income support recipients can become 
dependent on income management. They highlighted 
the risk that it can act as a disincentive to move into 
paid employment. They mentioned cases where 
people moved into paid employment and struggled 
financially because they did not have the skills to 
manage their own income. (McClure 2015:114)
More generally, the report indicated that the stakeholders 
consulted by the reference group held a diverse set 
of views about the program. These ranged from those 
who argued for the income management of all income 
support, those who proposed its use as an individualised 
and temporary support to stabilise individual 
circumstances, and those who rejected the program 
outright. The reference group also emphasised the need 
for the outcomes of income management to be evaluated, 
and that policies should be informed by the evaluations 
that were in place as the reference group prepared 
its report.
3.4.13 Community consultations on the Forrest 
review ‘Creating parity’ report, South Australian 
Commissioner for Aboriginal Engagement, 2014
In 2014, the South Australian Commissioner for Aboriginal 
Engagement undertook consultations with Indigenous 
communities and organisations36 on the full range 
of recommendations of the Forrest report. Although 
the consultations indicated support for some of the 
proposals, at times qualified, other proposals were not 
supported. In addition, there were some strong critiques 
of the review’s approach, including what communities 
saw as a lack of respect for Aboriginal culture, a lack of 
recognition of a diversity of needs across communities, 
and the failure of the report to address issues, including 
racial discrimination and a lack of cultural competency by 
employers, and education and training providers.
With respect to the proposal for the Healthy Welfare 
Card, the report stated:
There was no support for this recommendation. 
A number of community members likened this 
proposed arrangement to the ‘handing out of rations’ 
to Aboriginal people. 
Community members in areas such as Ceduna, 
Port Augusta and Coober Pedy drew similarities 
between this proposal and the ‘Basics Card’ income 
management scheme that is in place within those 
communities. They believed that total income 
management would lead to more strain on extended 
families, increased crime, and a ‘black market’ 
of selling goods (such as whitegoods) for cash. 
(Commissioner for Aboriginal Engagement 2015:8)
4 Key New Income Management 
evaluation findings
The evaluation of NIM in the Northern Territory presented 
extensive findings in its two reports. Six specific aspects 
of the findings are considered below: the attitudes and 
perceptions of people on the measure; four dimensions 
of impact – on consumption, on financial behaviour, 
on individual and community outcomes, and on 
dependence; and the relative impact of the programs on 
Indigenous Australians. In addition to these, the reports 
made significant findings with respect to other program 
elements, including the role of subprograms and the 
outcomes of the exemptions process.
The following sections discuss each of these, drawing 
on the findings of the other research discussed above, 
to identify the extent to which there is commonality or 
divergence in the findings.
4.1 Perceptions and views of people 
on income management
The NIM evaluation identified diverse views about 
income management among those who were subject 
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to the measure. Although the responses varied by the 
particular question asked, a typical pattern of response 
can be seen in the responses to the question of ‘whether 
income management has made things better’ for the 
person. Across the Indigenous population on compulsory 
income management, 44.1% said it had made things 
better, 35.3% said it had made no difference and 20.6% 
said that it had made things worse. For non-Indigenous 
persons on compulsory income management, the 
equivalent proportions were 25.4%, 29.1% and 45.5%, 
indicating a much more negative pattern of responses. 
In contrast, the population37 on Voluntary Income 
Management was much more positive, with 83.3% saying 
that it had made things better, 12.5% that it had made no 
difference and 4.2% that it made things worse. 
While there were some gender differences, with women 
being more positive than men, these were, in general, 
small. Among the Indigenous population, there were also 
marked differences by location. The key feature of this 
was that the experience and views of Indigenous people 
on the compulsory measures who were living in urban 
areas, other than in town camps, were substantially 
closer to those of the non-Indigenous population. 
Other questions used in the analysis presented in the 
evaluation identify more complex feelings. For example, 
only half of those on Voluntary Income Management, a 
third of Indigenous respondents on compulsory measures 
and a quarter of non-Indigenous respondents on these 
programs state that they ‘hardly ever’ or ‘never’ feel that it 
is unfair being income managed.
The evaluation report stated, however, that significant 
caution needs to be exercised in interpreting these types 
of views in undertaking a program evaluation:
From an evaluation perspective, while peoples’ views 
of income management are important, the essential 
question remains as to whether income management 
improves outcomes. Good policy may not always 
be seen positively by those whom it affects or by 
those implementing it, nor do positive feelings about 
a program mean that it is effective. (Bray et al. 
2014a:315)
A similar diversity of views around income management 
is recorded in most of the other studies, although the 
balance varies. The AIHW NTER evaluation reported that 
65.6% thought income management was ‘good’ (although 
this fluctuated from 23.1% to 92.3% by location38), and 
32.8% thought it was ‘bad’; 1.6% were undecided (AIHW 
2010:37). In the study of women’s experience, using the 
proxy of remaining on BasicsCard, the results were: 
79% answered I do not like using the BasicsCard and 
want to stop using it now. 20% answered I am happy 
with the BasicsCard and want to keep using it as it is 
now … 1% answered I would use the BasicsCard if it 
was voluntary. (Equality Rights Alliance 2011:29) 
As has been noted, this survey was based on a self-
selected group of participants and is not likely to 
be representative.
The Central Land Council study of six communities 
summarised its findings as: 
Responses across survey participants were evenly 
divided between people in favour and opposed to 
income management. Gender and age were not 
significant factors in influencing people’s level of 
support for income management. (CLC 2008:4)
Perceptions also varied by who was asked. As an 
example, the ORIMA Research (2010) study of Child 
Protection Income Management in Western Australia 
reported the views of different intermediaries and people 
on the child protection measure about the impact of the 
program on family relationships. It reported that: 
Around half of Centrelink staff (58%), financial 
counsellors and money management advisers (45%) 
and DCP [Department for Child Protection – Western 
Australia] staff (44%) believed that the CPSIM trial 
had a positive impact on clients’ family relationships. 
(ORIMA Research 2010:130) 
In contrast, the report indicated that:
The majority of CPSIM clients felt that IM had not had 
any impacts on relationships within their family … 
Three-quarters of CPSIM clients (76%) felt that this 
was the case when they were on IM – 74% of current 
and 78% of previous clients. (ORIMA Research 
2010:128)
These results show not just differences between ‘experts’ 
and those subject to the policy, but also between 
different intermediaries and experts.
4.1.1 Summary
Most research has identified a range of views on different 
aspects of income management, some strongly positive 
and others very negative. The balance of views varies, 
particularly between those on compulsory and voluntary 
measures. The NIM evaluation also identified differences 
by location, with people living in remote communities 
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and in some town camps being more positive about the 
program than those in urban locations, who were more 
likely to express negative views. The pattern of responses 
is also very dependent on the specific question that is 
being asked. This type of question also raises some 
issues about how changes in perceptions should be 
interpreted.39
The NIM evaluation noted that, while these types of 
views need to be considered, they are not a substitute 
for actual measurement of changes in outcomes and 
circumstances as a basis for identifying the impact of 
the program.
4.2 Impact on consumption
The NIM evaluation made a number of findings around 
the impact of income management on consumption. 
The first was that the conceptual and indeed the legal 
framework around ‘priority needs’ appears now to just 
be a rhetorical40 stance. The nature of BasicsCard is that 
it only restricts spending on excluded items, and the 
composition of spending on the card appears – with the 
exception of tobacco – to be broadly similar to the usual 
pattern of sales in these stores. 
The second finding was that there was no evidence 
of the share of spending on tobacco declining, nor of 
an increase in fruit and vegetable sales. Rather, the 
research found that the composition of diets in remote 
communities, as identified in BasicsCard spending, 
continues to be an issue of grave concern.
The third is that, while there was a weakly significant 
improvement in people on Voluntary Income Management 
reporting that they had run out of money for food, there 
was no change for those on the compulsory income 
management measures.
These findings are in general supported by a number 
of the other more detailed research reports, but not 
universally across all the studies. 
Take firstly the question of spending on priority needs. It 
would appear that the DSS claim in its 2013–14 annual 
report that 100% of spending is on priority needs (see 
Section 3.3.2) is unsustainable and is quite misleading. 
All of the studies that have looked at the detail of the 
purchases made on BasicsCard are aware of the wide 
variety of goods purchased relative to the ‘priority needs’ 
specified in legislation. Rather, the concept appears 
to be simply one which continues to operate in the 
department’s advocacy at a rhetorical level, with no 
regard to the legislative definition of what these priority 
needs are.41
With respect to tobacco spending, there are data on a 
single store in the CLC ‘six communities’ report which 
indicate a one-year fall in the share of spending on 
tobacco from 12.2% of sales across a range of identified 
items to 6.9% (CLC 2008:36). This figure does not appear 
to be plausible as a general income management effect 
in the context of the other studies, such as that of AIHW, 
which reported that some three-quarters of stores 
reported that sales were unchanged. Nor is the finding 
consistent with actual tobacco sales data from a number 
of remote stores which were used in Brimblecombe 
et al. (2010), as well as the NIM analysis which shows 
no change (although the latter noted a price impact on 
volume). The Mäpuru study (Puszka et al. 2013) reported 
that the purchase of cigarettes was ‘more difficult’, but 
did not quantify the impact of this. 
Turning to the incidence of smoking, the Cultural 
& Indigenous Research Centre Australia analysis 
included in the AIHW report suggested that 85% of 
smokers reduced their spending on tobacco on income 
management.42 This seems a remarkably high figure, 
and one that, if it occurred as a generalised income 
management effect, would surely have echoed strongly 
through the sales data, as well as being reflected in other 
studies such as the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Health Survey (NATSIHS) conducted by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). This was not the 
case, and a comparison of the NATSIHS data in 2012–13 
with that in 2004–05 showed no change, or even a slight 
worsening, in the incidence of daily smoking (Bray et al. 
2014a:231).43 
The Deloitte Place-Based Income Management 
evaluation reported that, while in the qualitative interviews 
some people reported that having been subject to 
income management had reduced their dependence 
on alcohol and tobacco (Deloitte 2015b:58), this effect 
was not identified in the quantitative longitudinal survey, 
which compared levels of smoking and drinking at 
various times, including before being subject to income 
management. The authors’ conclusion from this was that 
‘PBIM did not have a significant impact on the financial 
stability, alcohol consumption patterns, gambling 
patterns, tobacco consumption patterns or housing 
stability’ (Deloitte 2015b:61).
The NIM evaluation found a pattern of lower spending 
on BasicsCard on fruit and vegetables relative to non-
BasicsCard spending in both major urban and remote 
stores.44 This was most marked in remote communities. 
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Both the NIM evaluation and the Brimblecombe et al. 
(2010) research suggest no change over time. In 
contrast, AIHW, as cited earlier, reported very strong 
improvements, with three-quarters of participants 
reporting spending more money on food, and over half 
spending more on vegetables, and over two-thirds 
of store managers reporting increased sales. Data 
on child nutrition from the ABS NATSIHS cited in the 
NIM evaluation (Bray et al. 2014a:225–226) showed 
inconsistent results for Indigenous children, with minor 
improvements in milk consumption between 2004–05 and 
2012–13, a very marked decline in vegetable consumption 
over the period and an improvement in fruit consumption. 
The study noted that there were other factors, such as 
school lunch programs, introduced in 2007 as part of the 
School Nutrition Program, which were likely to have had 
an impact, especially as these programs tend to have 
a visible fruit component. More generally, the NATSIHS 
data indicate, consistent with stores data cited in the NIM 
evaluation, continuing major issues with nutrition, with 
over a third of children not having an adequate daily fruit 
intake and some 95% not having an adequate vegetable 
intake. If the changes cited in some of the earlier studies 
were correct, it appears highly improbable that the 
changes would not also have been seen in trends in 
sales, the adequacy of current diets or health surveys.
The third issue was that of food security and running 
out of food. Here the NIM evaluation found a small and 
weakly significant improvement in the incidence of 
running out of money for food for those on Voluntary 
Income Management and no change for either Indigenous 
or non-Indigenous people on the compulsory measures. 
This pattern of responses is very similar to those 
recorded in Place-Based Income Management, although 
in the evaluation of this measure none of the movements 
was statistically significant between the baseline and 
final survey.
The AIHW report indicated that in the 2008 ‘Community 
Feedback Report’, which used qualitative data for four 
communities, the purchase of more food was ‘identified 
consistently across the research’ (AIHW 2010:46), with 
the ORIMA Research Western Australian evaluation of 
Child Protection and Voluntary Income Management 
reporting that the proportion running out of food 
decreased from 59% prior to being placed on income 
management to 29% while on the measure, and 16% 
after having left the program (ORIMA Research 2010:122). 
The DSS evaluation of the same program reported that, 
from a survey of 32 program participants, about a third 
of people spoke of no longer running out of money for 
food each day (DSS 2014a:50). The APY Lands study 
did not look at actual change over time, but found that 
72.5% of those who had chosen to go onto income 
management had run out of money for food in the past 
four weeks, compared with 56.1% of those not on income 
management (Katz & Bates 2014:22). The need for 
caution in interpreting data on perceived improvements 
in food was highlighted in the first NIM evaluation report 
(Bray et al. 2012:196), which presented an analysis of the 
marked discrepancies between perceived and recorded 
change in ability to purchase adequate food for some 
income-managed populations.
In addition to these findings, the data collected in a 
number of studies show that there are high and persistent 
problems of food security and in the nutritional value of 
food consumed, which remain across major components 
of the populations on income management, even while 
they are on the program.
4.2.1 Summary
Despite perceptions of improved consumption of some 
food items and claims that income-managed funds 
are being spent on priority goods, those studies which 
have considered sales data and actual consumption 
in longitudinal terms indicate that there is little or no 
evidence of this actually happening. Given the nature 
of these relative data sources and the potential bias in 
responses, it can be considered that the findings based 
on actual change over time and on the basis of sales 
are much more robust. More generally, these studies 
also highlight significant problems that have continued 
unabated by program activities. Although some very 
limited early data on tobacco use suggested there was 
some evidence of a reduction (although even this was 
inconsistent across locations and studies), later studies 
and alternative sources suggest this is not the case, 
other than possibly for some on the voluntary measure, 
and that overall tobacco sales have not been affected. 
With regard to food security, where this has been 
tracked over time, there is some, although not wholly 
consistent, evidence suggesting some improvements 
for those on voluntary measures, but a more general 
finding of no effect for those on compulsory forms of 
income management.
4.3 Impact on financial behaviours
The NIM evaluation concluded that there was minimal 
impact from the program on the financial capability 
of program participants. This was based on detailed 
examination of a range of indicators, including the pattern 
of failed BasicsCard transactions, how people care for 
and use their BasicsCards, and spending patterns of 
income-managed funds. It also took account of changes 
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in reported household outcomes and the impact of 
the specific programs designed to improve financial 
management skills. 
The report noted that, although there were very 
positive reports of perceived improvements in financial 
management capabilities, these were not sustained in 
actual changes. It cited results from survey responses 
by people who had exited income management, among 
whom ‘some 44 per cent of Indigenous and 30 per 
cent of non-Indigenous respondents agreed with the 
statement that “income management taught me how to 
better manage my money”’ (Bray et al. 2014a:304), and 
the more ambiguous finding that: 
Between 40 and 50 per cent of Indigenous people 
on income management indicated that most or all 
of the time they felt that they were more in control of 
their life, and had more control over their money. In 
contrast some 50 to 60 per cent of non-Indigenous 
people reported that they hardly ever or never felt this 
way. (Bray et al. 2014a:304) 
These apparently positive sentiments were then 
compared with a series of quantitative measures derived 
from survey and administrative data. This found some 
isolated indicators of impact for some of those on 
Voluntary Income Management but not for others.
The longitudinal survey allowed some changes in 
experience over time to be studied. With respect to 
whether people had problems paying bills on time, the 
NIM evaluation found a small but significant improvement 
for those on the voluntary measure, but no significant 
change for those on compulsory measures. This is the 
same pattern, noted above, with regard to running out of 
money for food.
Using the administrative data, a number of indicators 
were constructed in the NIM evaluation to assess 
whether there may have been changes in the financial 
management capacity of people as a result of their 
experience of being income managed.45 Three are 
discussed here.
The first was one of several measures which looked at 
the relative behaviour of a matched sample of people 
in October 2011 and October 2013. This considered the 
proportion of time people had low financial balances in 
their income management accounts as an indicator of the 
extent to which people managed their spending over time 
and kept any reserves for unexpected costs. This found, 
for example, at best, a slight fall (from 28.0% to 26.0%) in 
the proportion who had a balance of less than $10 in their 
income-managed funds for more than half the period 
between receipt of payments (Bray et al. 2014a:163). 
A second set of measures concerned the incidence of 
failed BasicsCard transactions. The expectation here 
was that these would decline as people better managed 
their funds, including being more aware of their available 
funds, if there were improvements in their financial 
management skills. The BasicsCard transaction data 
showed that around 10% of attempted purchases failed 
because people had an inadequate balance to cover the 
purchase. Analysis of the incidence of this type of failed 
transaction over the duration of NIM found that, while 
the rate declined over time, this was a relatively small 
shift, especially when account was taken of improved 
balance-checking facilities (Bray et al. 2014a:153–161). 
It also found that more recent groups placed on the 
program showed lower levels of financial vulnerability on 
this measure. This would suggest that the program was 
becoming increasingly targeted at people with higher 
levels of financial management skills. 
A third indicator was the rate of BasicsCard replacement. 
This was seen as providing some insight into how 
well people took on their financial management 
responsibilities, including taking action to care for 
the card and minimise the risk of loss or theft. On 
average, across the program, each participant had 
5.3 replacement cards issued to them each year because 
of loss, theft or related causes. There was a lack of any 
decline in this rate associated with duration of time on 
income management, although there was a slight fall in 
the number of replacement cards over time for a matched 
population (Bray et al. 2014a:148–153). 
The lack of marked impact of the program in 
substantively improving financial management capacity, 
across these and an array of associated measures, was 
also emphasised by the failure of the matched savings 
program. This program, which was envisaged as a major 
element of the wider approach of building financial 
management capability through income management, 
resulted in just 31 grants being made for successful 
outcomes in this program, from a target population of 
about 29 500 (Bray et al. 2014a:297).46
The ORIMA Research study concluded its discussion of 
financial management as: 
The evaluation found some evidence of a positive 
impact of the measures on the financial management 
capabilities of participants, but this was not as 
conclusive as the evidence in relation to … wellbeing. 
(ORIMA Research 2010:17) 
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The AIHW study, relying on the perception of respondents 
in surveys and stakeholders in focus groups, reported 
some positive change. The APY Lands study suggested 
that people had a feeling of greater control, but also 
indicated that the management of cards was frequently 
quite flexible – for example, letting others use it (Katz 
& Bates 2014:18). The DSS Western Australian Child 
Protection Income Management study concluded, ‘It 
remained unclear whether income management provided 
recipients with financial management skills’ (DSS 
2014a:69–70).
The Deloitte study summarised its findings as, ‘For VIM 
customers, PBIM appeared to have a positive impact on 
their capability to better save and spend their money’ 
(Deloitte 2015b:ii), but those on the compulsory measure 
‘did not demonstrate a significant improvement in their 
capability or confidence in saving or spending their 
money’ (Deloitte 2015b:iii).
A final issue with respect to financial behaviour concerns 
the variety of ways in which people use their BasicsCard. 
The conceptual approach of the program is highly 
individualistic. A person is issued with an individual 
BasicsCard, which has a personalised PIN,47 that is 
to be used to purchase the ‘basic’ items a person and 
their children need. This is not what occurs in many 
cases. Rather, the NIM evaluation found that cards are 
used highly flexibly and in different ways, depending on 
individual circumstances. Over a third of participants 
stated that they swapped or shared cards when shopping 
with others; almost 45% said they let others use the card 
to do shopping on their behalf; and over a third said that 
they let others use their card for their own purchases. 
Between 12% and 15% reported they or members of 
their family had engaged in various practices such as 
swapping food for cash, alcohol or tobacco, or getting 
cash from taxi drivers (Bray et al. 2014a:135). Some of 
these practices were also reported by the Queensland 
Parliamentary Committee on the Cape York trial 
(Ruthenberg 2014) and by Katz and Bates (2014), noted 
above, in their research on the APY Lands. This was also 
reported in the Deloitte evaluation: ‘it is recognised that 
mechanisms remain for customers to “get around” using 
the BasicsCard’ (Deloitte 2015b:68). 
4.3.1 Summary
There is a large degree of consistency in studies reporting 
perceptions of improvements in financial management 
capabilities by at least a significant proportion of the 
people who were subject to income management. Only 
a more limited number of studies have looked at actual 
evidence of change. These find some, more isolated, 
positives of varying degrees for those on the voluntary 
program, and no change for those on compulsory forms 
of income management. This seems to be consistent with 
the findings from the NIM evaluation.
4.4 Impact on individual and 
community outcomes
The analysis undertaken as part of the NIM evaluation 
took a multilevel approach in seeking to identify 
outcomes. In addition to seeking to measure outcomes 
at the individual level, it considered the outcomes 
program participants reported for the communities in 
which they live, and reviewed data more widely to seek 
to identify changes in outcomes across communities in 
the Northern Territory, and in the Territory as a whole. It 
found there was no systematic pattern of improvement 
which could be associated with income management. 
Indeed, despite both income management and the much 
wider array of initiatives associated with the Northern 
Territory Intervention and other programs operating in the 
Northern Territory, overwhelmingly the indicators point 
to no improvements in community outcomes, or, where 
there was change, this was consistent with changes more 
widely across Australia.
The results of analysis of changes in individual 
consumption and financial capability outcomes have 
been discussed above. In addition, the evaluation looked 
at the incidence of problems for people and their family. 
The first measure of these was the incidence of problems 
with alcohol, drugs and gambling. This had two elements: 
firstly whether any problem existed, either large or small; 
and secondly whether or not they had at least one large 
(‘very big’) problem. The results of this analysis suggested 
that, while there was some evidence of a reduction in the 
incidence of at least one of these areas being a problem 
for all groups,48 there was no reduction in the incidence 
of at least one being a major problem. Indeed, for some 
groups on income management, the incidence of major 
problems had increased (Bray et al. 2014a:185). That is, 
while some milder problems appear to have declined, the 
occurrence of more severe problems had not or, in some 
cases, might have increased.
One of the ways in which income management was 
to have improved outcomes was by reducing the 
vulnerability of people to financial harassment and 
reducing the level of this within communities. Although 
the NIM evaluation found that Indigenous people49 – on 
both voluntary and compulsory measures – reported 
a reduced incidence of problems because they gave 
money to others, they equally recorded an increase 
in having to ask others for money for essentials (Bray 
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et al. 2014a:189). This suggests a need for some caution 
in interpreting the claims of other studies of reduced 
humbugging. The need for this caution is reinforced 
by the results of the analysis of longitudinal survey 
responses on financial harassment at the community 
level. This found no evidence of change. More generally, 
longitudinal analysis of the survey responses on the 
incidence of a range of community problems, including 
child outcomes and problems such as too much 
drinking, found no positive outcomes at the individual 
or community level, and indeed a number of the more 
specific questions had negative results.
Given the high proportion of the Indigenous population 
in the Northern Territory placed on income management, 
to the extent that the program had significant effects 
on behaviours and outcomes, it could be expected that 
these should also be apparent at more aggregate levels. 
This was investigated through an extensive review of 
a diverse set of outcomes for the Northern Territory, 
including in the areas of child mortality and health, 
education attendance and outcomes, the incidence of 
alcohol-related crime and the role of alcohol in hospital 
admissions. All of this analysis found no significant 
improvements which could be associated with income 
management. Indeed, more generally, the evaluation 
noted that this result not only reflected the lack of change 
associated with income management, but, as noted 
above, more broadly the very limited change in outcomes 
associated with the whole of the Intervention and 
related initiatives.
Figs 1 and 2 provide some of the updated data from the 
AIHW Children’s Headline Indicators (AIHW 2015) for the 
incidence of low birthweight and infant mortality, which 
continue to show the pattern of no positive change which 
can be associated with income management.
The findings of the ORIMA Research (2010) study in 
Western Australia presented some inconsistent results 
on both individual and community outcomes. On the one 
hand, the study reported from surveys of participants that 
70% of people on Child Protection Income Management 
reported less drinking in their community, along with 
67% saying there was less violence, 62% less gambling 
and 60% less humbugging (ORIMA Research 2010:132). 
A slightly lower proportion of those on Voluntary 
Income Management reported these outcomes, with 
the exception of humbugging, where 51% said it had 
increased (ORIMA Research 2010:215). In contrast, 
the study reported, based on a survey of Centrelink 
staff, Department for Child Protection – Western 
Australia staff, and financial counsellors and money 
management advisers who were considered to have an 
understanding of the impact that may have occurred in 
communities, that: 
On average across the three groups, no material 
impact was the option most commonly selected 
by respondents in relation to all behaviours except 
excessive drinking (where respondents were more 
likely to report that IM had had a positive impact). 
(ORIMA Research 2010:133)
The Central Land Council study also reported mixed 
views, this time within the population subject to NTERIM, 
although, overall, 39.2% of respondents said there was 
less alcohol consumption and 18.4% slightly less (CLC 
2008:51). The extent of this perceived change, however, 
not only varied across communities, but was attributed to 
a range of policies and not just to income management. 
Other factors cited were that there had been more 
policing and increased penalties for transporting alcohol 
into communities. The study also reported that, with one 
exception, ‘the perspective of most GBMs [government 
business managers] from the communities surveyed was 
that there had been no real shift in alcohol consumption 
in communities’ (CLC 2008:54). Reflecting these results, 
it concluded that, notwithstanding perceptions of a 
decrease in consumption, ‘evidence as to whether this 
is actually occurring is inconclusive. More research is 
needed before any conclusive findings about changes in 
alcohol consumption can be made’ (CLC 2008:51).
There is relatively little on measurable outcomes available 
on the Cape York program, although the evaluation 
(FaHCSIA 2012) did identify a decline in the rate of 
notices issued to people in some locations – which can 
be taken as an indicator of whether behaviours had 
changed. The data in the report indicate, across the 
trial-wide population, there was a reduction in notices 
from an average of 0.88 per quarter before being placed 
on income management, to 0.87 per quarter after 
placement (FaHCSIA 2012:209). Both the magnitude and 
direction of change varied for the individual locations in 
which the program operated. On less direct outcomes, 
such as building independence and higher participation 
in education, training and employment, it reported 
that ‘the trial has not yet brought about significant 
behaviour change in these areas’ (FaHCSIA 2012:62). It 
did report some tentative, but quite positive, changes at 
the community level, but was uncertain whether these 
could be linked to the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial 
because there had also been gains in other Queensland 
communities and there had been multiple initiatives (see 
the discussion in FaHCSIA 2012:221).
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The AIHW study of NTERIM reported that:
There was some evidence from client interviews and 
stakeholder focus groups that child and community 
wellbeing had improved since the introduction of 
income management. The impact on families was 
less clear. It was also difficult to separate the effects 
of income management on these outcomes from the 
effects of other NTER measures designed to improve 
the wellbeing of children, families and communities 
… 
In relation to the impact on families, the data from the 
client interviews showed that only a minority thought 
there had been changes since income management. 
(AIHW 2010:61)
As identified in both the NIM evaluation and the  
Shaw and d’Abbs (2011) study, many of these perceived 
changes do not appear to be confirmed when tested 
against other more neutral measures of change, and 
considerable caution needs to be exercised in the 
interpretation of these responses. Both of these studies, 
for example, note that, while some participants have 
reported strong improvements in school attendance as 
a positive outcome from income management in their 
communities, when these claims are tested against 
the administrative data from the schools themselves, 
no change in attendance has occurred, or indeed in some 
cases, attendance worsened.
The Place-Based Income Management evaluation, as 
noted above with respect to consumption, did not find 
changes in the above behaviours, and in its summary 
reports: ‘The longitudinal survey did not find sustained, 
significant impacts on self-reports of smoking, drinking 
or gambling habits across any of the measures’ (Deloitte 
2015b:iii), for those on either the compulsory or voluntary 
measures. It however cites anecdotal reports suggesting 
that for some individuals it might have had an impact 
where they were self-motivated to change. In looking at 
data on health and school attendance, Deloitte reported 
(see Section 3.2.7) that they could not find any evidence 
of direct improvements. 
While Lamb and Young (2011) found some evidence 
of reduced spending on electronic gaming machines 
associated with the introduction of NTERIM, they 
expressed some caution around this finding. 
Furthermore, as they only considered one type of 
gambling, this study cannot inform as to whether there 
was any substitution of other forms. The NIM evaluation, 
however, reported only a very low incidence of reports of 
gambling using BasicsCards.
FIG. 1.  Incidence of low birthweight, by 
Indigenous status, Northern Territory and 
Australia, 2006–12
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FIG. 2 .  Infant mortality, by Indigenous status, 
Northern Territory and Australia, 2004–06 to 
2011–13
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With regard to harassment, the dual characteristics of 
the NIM finding – that is, some reduction of problems 
because of giving money to others, but an increased 
incidence of seeking money from others – is also seen in 
the Place-Based Income Management evaluation. While 
having only qualitative data on this, Deloitte reported that 
‘PBIM had been effective in reducing the vulnerability of 
individuals to financial exploitation and harassment with 
respect to their welfare payments’ (Deloitte 2015b:iii), 
but also cited ‘reports of negative impacts placed on 
relationships – where some respondents noted an 
increased dependence on others around them for funds’ 
(Deloitte 2015a:88).
The APY Lands study was tentative in its conclusions 
concerning change in communities, recognising it 
was only reliant on the views of community members 
and stakeholders, was not longitudinal, and ‘it was 
not possible to verify these findings through objective 
measures of changes in wellbeing’ (Katz & Bates 2014:2). 
Given this, it summarised its findings as: 
There are mixed responses in relation to the impact 
of income management on the wellbeing of the 
community as a whole, but overall there is a belief 
that it has had a positive impact so far, although its 
impact is limited. (Katz & Bates 2014:1)
A further limitation, as detailed by the authors, was: 
… findings are not able to provide indications of 
changes in overall community wellbeing resulting 
from the implementation of income management 
through outcome measures such as school 
attendance, child health assessments, child 
protection notifications, crime rates, or changes in 
spending patterns. (Katz & Bates 2014:42)
4.4.1 Summary
In looking at this set of individual and community 
outcomes, although a number of studies have reported 
some findings which, taken in isolation, can be used 
to suggest some gains, this does not constitute 
robust evidence. 
In the first instance, many of these results have not 
been sustained when more robust analysis has been 
undertaken and independent data have been used to 
attempt to verify the results. Second, there is an absence 
in most studies of any coherent pattern of improved 
outcomes which would suggest systematic change has 
occurred. Examples of this latter include the identification 
of change for only one subgroup on income management 
– suggesting it is not income management per se which 
is the causal factor – or where changes are not consistent 
across locations and there is an absence of a rationale for 
why there would be an impact from income management 
in one location but not another.
This suggests a need for these earlier findings to be 
treated with caution. While in some cases the reports 
seek to advise users of these limitations, in other cases 
the studies simply report the contradictory findings 
without seeking to explore what these mean for the 
validity of other findings, including those they choose 
to headline as results. A key question on the research 
concerns methodology and the extent to which the more 
positive findings have very frequently relied on the views 
of external intermediaries, including some who have a 
stake in the program, or are self-reported changes – or 
perception of changes – by participants in single cross-
section surveys or consultations. As identified in some 
studies, these survey responses are likely to reflect what 
is seen by participants as being the socially desirable 
response. The tendency to provide such a response may 
be exacerbated by past trauma faced by communities 
and the extent to which many communities may feel 
under threat. 
In comparison to these methodologies, the NIM 
evaluation can be considered to have adopted a more 
robust approach; it used longitudinal data on changes 
in outcomes50 relative to a control population, as did 
the Place-Based Income Management evaluation, and 
a range of independent administrative and other data. 
Because of the magnitude of the program in the Northern 
Territory with, as has been noted above, over a third of 
the Indigenous population aged over 15 years on income 
management, the NIM evaluation was also able to use 
extensive and independent data on wider community 
outcomes to test its findings. 
The balance of the results across the studies would 
suggest, as was found in the NIM evaluation, that, 
although there are some perceptions of improvement 
reported by some participants and intermediaries, 
more robust analysis of actual outcomes, and the 
use of longitudinal analysis with control populations, 
there are few grounds to support these perceptions 
of improvement. This is also largely the finding of the 
Place-Based Income Management evaluation, which 
again adopted a more sophisticated approach than much 
of the early analysis. These results suggest that there 
is a commonality with the NIM findings with respect to 
perceptions, and, where studies have gone further, with 
the finding that there is a lack of consistency between 
many of these perceptions and the actual incidence of 
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change. It was in taking analysis of the latter further that 
the NIM evaluation was able to provide firmer findings 
than the earlier research, a position largely endorsed by 
the Place-Based Income Management results.
4.5 Impact on dependency
A concluding observation of the NIM evaluation, as cited 
earlier, is that the program appears to have encouraged 
increasing dependence on the welfare system rather 
than achieving the goals of fostering independence 
and building capacity. This conclusion was based on 
a number of the more detailed findings, including the 
extent to which some people wished to remain on income 
management – and the main reasons nominated for 
wishing to do so. For those on the compulsory measures, 
the evaluation found that the major reason was that 
it was ‘easier to manage money’ (with over half the 
Indigenous and more than 40% of the non-Indigenous 
respondents citing this as a reason) followed by ‘I am 
used to income management and it is easier to stay 
on’ (Bray et al. 2014a:174). This pattern was even more 
marked among those on Voluntary Income Management, 
with 57.7% of respondents giving the ease of money 
management as their main reason, and 73.1% indicating 
that it was one of the reasons (Bray et al. 2014a:260). 
In addition, as discussed above, the evaluation found 
little evidence of improved financial capability and low 
levels of engagement with services to build their financial 
management skills. The latter was summarised in a 
comment made by a participant in a recent interview: 
‘Why do I need to learn how to manage my money, 
Centrelink does it for me’.51
The risk of this type of dependence has been a recurrent 
theme in many of the studies. The ORIMA Research 
report noted the most commonly reported potential 
negative outcome of the program was that ‘clients might 
become dependent on the system and not be able to 
manage their finances without remaining on IM’ (ORIMA 
Research 2010:12). This was echoed in the 2014 DSS 
report on the same program: ‘Intermediaries suggested 
that income management could cause dependency for 
some recipients, evidenced in their inability to budget 
without it’ (DSS 2014a:69). The Place-Based Income 
Management evaluation noted, in the short-term report, 
from an analysis of duration, that there was a ‘question 
of possible dependency on the PBIM measure’ (Deloitte 
2014b:101) and again in the medium-term report that 
the data raise ‘the question of dependency on external 
financial management’ (Deloitte 2015a:26–27). Although 
only a minority of DSS staff reported concerns about 
dependence in the focus groups, Deloitte reported 
‘there was concern that income management had led to 
dependency on DHS to pay customers’ bills’ (Deloitte 
2015a:74), and referred to ‘learned dependence’ (Deloitte 
2015a:91). More specifically, the qualitative research 
reports that, for some young people impacted by the 
automatic trigger, ‘income management was detrimental 
to their establishment of financial independence’ (Deloitte 
2015b:53). The Auditor-General as cited previously also 
identified this as a risk (ANAO 2013:68). It has also been 
raised by external commentators, including Brown (2010) 
and Arthur (2013). 
A number of the studies have gone further. As cited 
earlier, the Forrest review reported that income 
management can reinforce dependence on income 
support because ‘it can make transitions off welfare and 
into work more difficult’ (Forrest 2014:27). The McClure 
committee encountered this issue in its consultations 
and, as quoted earlier, heard reports of particular cases 
where income management not only was a disincentive 
but left people without skills to manage their money.
4.5.1 Summary
The question of increased dependence has been raised 
consistently across many of the studies, including both 
of the two major policy reviews. The finding of the NIM 
evaluation in this regard is well supported.
4.6 Impact on Indigenous Australians
Overwhelmingly, income management is a policy that 
has been imposed on Indigenous Australians. This has 
been achieved through the geographic targeting of the 
program at locations with high Indigenous populations, 
the overrepresentation of Indigenous people among 
income support recipients, including as a result of the 
specific payment types that have been targeted by 
income management, and the low rate of exemptions 
for Indigenous people subject to Compulsory Income 
Management in the Northern Territory.
The evaluation framework for NIM included the 
question ‘Has the measure been implemented in a 
non-discriminatory manner?’ This framing is, however, 
narrow and is primarily concerned with process rather 
than overall outcomes. In response to the question, the 
evaluation reported that, in both waves of the research, 
it had:
… not identified any active and overt discrimination 
in the implementation of New Income Management 
in the Northern Territory, and there was no evidence 
produced that Centrelink staff tend to be prejudiced 
or discriminatory. (Bray et al. 2014a:300)
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The evaluation did, however, go on to state: 
At the same time, income management 
disproportionately impacts on the Indigenous 
community in the Northern Territory and this group 
has not been able to avail itself of mechanisms such 
as exemptions at anything like the same rate as the 
non-Indigenous population. (Bray et al. 2014a:300) 
With respect to exemptions, the report estimated 
that, controlling for personal characteristics,52 while 
a non-Indigenous person with dependent children 
on Compulsory Income Management had a 55.0% 
probability of making an application and a 65.9% chance 
of this being successful, an Indigenous person in the 
same situation had a probability of making an application 
of 33.4% and a rate of success of 34.3%. The disparities 
were even greater for those without children (Bray et al. 
2014a:106).
The final report cited the findings of the first report with 
regard to exemptions and the fact that little had changed 
over the intervening period, specifically:
The First Evaluation Report identified significant 
problems with the exemption process, stating:
There seemed to be little support available to 
assist people in developing and presenting their 
case for exemption; gathering the supporting 
documentation was too demanding for many 
people. The centralisation of the exemption 
process in Darwin was also a barrier for people 
in other locations who prefer dealing face to 
face rather than over the telephone. The process 
for obtaining exemptions was seen by many 
stakeholders as imposing a heavy reverse 
burden of proof on people subject to income 
management to prove they meet the exemption 
criteria. (Bray et al. 2012)
There is little evidence to suggest this has changed. 
In particular, Indigenous people continue to apply 
for exemptions at a much lower rate and with lower 
success. (Bray et al. 2014a:296–297)
The evaluation of Place-Based Income Management 
provided data showing that 15.2% of people on Place-
Based Income Management are Indigenous, including 
28.4% of those on social worker–assessed vulnerable 
measures, compared with 11.8% of income support 
recipients in the areas affected by the program. In 
analysis, however, the evaluation reported ‘Indigenous 
status was found to be of relatively low importance in 
determining the propensity for a customer to be on 
PBIM’ (Deloitte 2014b:28). This latter finding is based on 
a classification tree approach, rather than more usual 
regression-based methodologies used to derive the 
wholly independent contribution of particular factors.
The DSS evaluation of Child Protection Income 
Management in Western Australia (DSS 2014a), besides 
observing that 63% of people placed on Child Protection 
Income Management were Indigenous, made no analysis 
of the relative impact of the program on Indigenous 
people. Similar scant coverage was provided in the 
ORIMA Research report, which simply presented a few 
tables showing the Indigenous status of participants, 
without any reference to the relative incidence of income 
management, and observed that ‘Indigenous CPSIM 
clients were slightly less likely to exit the program’ 
(ORIMA Research 2010:56).
The AIHW study of NTERIM was largely silent on this 
matter. In its executive summary, for example, the 
researchers did not even note that the program was 
specifically addressed at Indigenous Australians, 
and indeed the only reference to ‘Indigenous’ or 
‘Aboriginal’, other than in the department’s name, 
occurred when noting the difficulty of collecting data in 
Indigenous communities.
Although the Auditor-General’s report provided data on 
the differential rejection rate of applications by indigeneity 
and notes stakeholder concerns about the differences 
in exemption rates for Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
people, the report did not seek to directly address the 
issue. Indeed, it would appear that at times it sought to 
downplay the extent to which the program impacts on 
Indigenous Australians. For example, while indicating 
that in interviews between Centrelink and program 
participants about exits from income management ‘the 
nature of discussions is often complex’, it is only in a 
footnote to this text that it records that ‘this can be a 
more significant issue for customers from a diverse 
cultural and linguistic background, including Indigenous 
Australians, who face English language and literacy 
barriers’ (ANAO 2013:63). In a similar fashion in the key 
findings, it appears to deliberately avoid making reference 
to indigeneity in reporting: 
Further, there would be benefit in DHS investigating 
whether there are any unintended barriers which 
either discourage particular customer groups from 
applying for an exemption, or affect the likelihood of 
their application being successful, and taking any 
necessary remedial action. (ANAO 2013:20)
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The question of the impact of income management, 
and related programs, in regard to Australia’s human 
rights obligations has, as noted, been considered 
twice by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights. In discussion of the extent to which the program 
disproportionately impacted on Indigenous Australians, 
the first report in 2013 concluded:
… the committee considers that, in light of the 
evidence that is available to the committee and 
notwithstanding that the income management regime 
pursue legitimate goals, the government has not yet 
clearly demonstrated that:
• the income management regime to the extent it may 
be viewed as having a differential impact based on 
race, is a reasonable and proportionate measure and 
therefore not discriminatory; or
• the income management regime is a justifiable 
limitation on the rights to social security and the right 
to privacy and family. (PJCHR 2013:91–62)
4.6.1 Summary
The NIM evaluation clearly documented the extent 
to which income management disproportionately 
impacts on Indigenous Australians and that there were 
significant barriers to Indigenous people accessing 
exemptions. In large part, this question is not considered 
by other studies. One reason for this may be because 
NIM is the only program which includes widespread 
compulsory income management, but also that such 
a disproportionate impact is simply assumed in other 
programs which are specifically targeted at Indigenous 
communities – for example, the APY Lands and Cape 
York. More generally it appears that many of the studies 
seek to avoid addressing this dimension of the program’s 
impact. It is, however, noted that the Place-Based Income 
Management study suggests that indigeneity only makes 
a minor direct contribution to the likelihood of being on 
income management under this program.
5 Conclusion – reflections on the 
evidence and interpretation
The above analysis shows that, once the scope and 
methodologies of individual studies, along with some 
of the caveats present in reports, are considered, there 
is a degree of consistency across the research as to 
the impact of income management, or, more precisely, 
the lack of impact of the program on changing adverse 
outcomes and behaviours, in particular for those placed 
on the program on a mandatory basis. This raises the 
question as to why there continues to be a persistent 
view within government that the program should be 
maintained, and indeed expanded.
This is considered in this final section, focusing firstly on 
how the findings of the research have been portrayed 
by governments, and then a final consideration of the 
way program evaluation of income management may 
have resulted in some of the more important questions 
not being addressed, let alone answered, in particular 
for Indigenous Australians, but also potentially for other 
income support recipients.
5.1 On interpreting the findings
As discussed in the introduction, the then Minister for 
Social Services responded to the findings of the NIM 
evaluation with a claim of the findings being ‘inconsistent 
with more positive findings’ of other evaluations. This 
section considers whether this was the case, and, if not, 
why this perception of inconsistency was presented.
5.1.1 Was the NIM evaluation out of step?
The above analysis would suggest that the findings of the 
NIM evaluation, while more robust than those of many 
of the other studies, tend to build upon these studies 
rather than being contradictory. To the extent that there 
are differences, these are very much around the extent to 
which the NIM evaluation went beyond simply relying on 
the perceptions of participants and certain intermediaries 
as they were reported to, or interpreted by, evaluators, to 
also directly focus on seeking to measure outcomes, and 
assess the impact of the program on this basis. This is 
consistent with the scale of this evaluation, in terms of the 
ability to assess change over time, and because of the 
scope of income management in the Northern Territory, 
which allowed the evaluation to consider its overall 
impact on the basis of independent measures.
In addition, there are significant differences in the scope 
and nature of the various income management regimes 
which have been implemented and evaluated. The Cape 
York trial has been tightly focused on people who have 
been identified as having significant individual or family 
problems, and is imposed only after a formal process 
of assessment in the context of a case management 
approach with counselling and support at the 
community level.
The Western Australian programs and the APY Lands 
program have mainly involved Voluntary Income 
Management and, to a much lesser degree, compulsory 
income management as part of a child protection 
Centre for Abor ig ina l  Economic Pol icy Research
32  Bray
response. A priori, it would be expected that the 
outcomes for those who choose to be income managed 
would be different to those who have the measure 
imposed on them, and indeed the NIM evaluation noted 
that this was the case for a number of the outcomes it 
examined. 
In the case of child protection, the use of income 
management was, in many cases, just one of a range of 
interventions, including close monitoring, and frequently 
counselling and other support. While the intervention in 
these cases was not necessarily associated with poor 
financial management and severe substance abuse, it 
was still based on an identified poor outcome. Again, this 
represents quite a different context to the more general 
imposition of income management under NIM. While the 
size of this element of the program, accounting for just 
0.5% of the income-managed population, precluded 
its inclusion in most of the statistical analysis and in 
the survey-based main outcome analysis undertaken 
as part of the NIM evaluation, it was one of the foci of 
the qualitative analysis. This reported a mixed picture 
of effectiveness, but on balance, where the program 
was appropriately focused on those where neglect was 
linked to poor money management and where it played a 
reinforcing role as part of a set of supports especially the 
Intensive Family Support Services, it was seen as being a 
useful tool.
The Place-Based Income Management initiative 
comprises both a small number of people on Voluntary 
Income Management and a larger population on 
compulsory income management, mainly being youth 
subject to the measure because of the automatic youth 
trigger. While this scope is much narrower than that 
of the NIM evaluation, the evaluation had a number of 
methodological similarities, although it lacked the use 
of independent outcome and consumption data. As 
discussed, the evaluation of this program found some 
positive, although limited, outcomes for the voluntary 
element, but these findings were not replicated for those 
on the compulsory elements – the primary focus of the 
NIM evaluation. 
5.1.2 Why a perception of inconsistency?
One of the reasons a perception of inconsistency may 
have arisen is as a consequence of repeated selective 
use of evaluation findings, with this becoming embedded 
in people’s perception of what the program outcomes 
actually are. The tendency by government to be selective 
is examined below with regard to the first NIM evaluation 
report, and then the short-term Place-Based Income 
Management and the APY Lands reports. 
Government reporting of the findings of the first 
evaluation report on NIM
The first NIM evaluation report presented its key findings 
in its summary as:
Taken as a whole there is not strong evidence that, 
at this stage, the program has had a major impact on 
outcomes overall. Although many individuals report 
some gains, others report more negative effects. 
(Bray et al. 2012:xxiii)
and concluded: 
More generally our analysis suggests that for many 
people the program largely operates more as a 
means of control rather than a process for building 
behaviours or changing attitudes or norms. (Bray 
et al. 2012:xxiv)
In the minister’s press release, the report was described 
as having ‘found that among Indigenous people on 
income management in the Northern Territory, there was 
a statistically significant perception of an improvement in 
their ability to afford food’, and that ‘income management 
may make a contribution to improving wellbeing for some, 
particularly those who have difficulties in managing their 
finances or are subject to financial harassment’ (Macklin 
2012).
The Department of Social Services, in an ‘Income 
management evaluation and review fact sheet’53 written 
in June 2014 and still posted on the website in late 2015,54 
presents the totality of the findings as ‘One of the findings 
from the first report, released in November 2012, was 
that Indigenous communities perceived an improvement 
in child wellbeing and ability to afford food’ (Australian 
Government 2014).
In addition to having failed to take account of the overall 
assessment of the evaluation, the minister’s statement, 
and the selective results cited by the department, require 
some attention. Turning to the ministerial media release, 
the first statement, as to the perception of being able 
to afford food, is a partial citation of a dot point in the 
summary of the evaluation and omits the second half of 
the text, which is a major qualifier. The full point reads:
Amongst Indigenous people on income management, 
there was a statistically significant perception of an 
improvement in their ability to afford food. Relative to 
the control group there was no reduction in the extent 
to which they reported running out of money for food. 
(Bray et al. 2012:xviii) 
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That is, while participants had a perception of change, 
this was not actually reflected in the outcomes they 
experienced. The ministerial statement simply ignores 
this fact.
The misleading use of this particular material is even 
more marked given the extent to which the evaluation 
report considered this issue. In the report, not only was 
the difference between the perception and outcome 
with regard to this aspect of food security highlighted 
in the summary reporting, it was subject to a page of 
analysis. This included the presentation of a chart which 
plotted the relative results of the two measures – that is, 
perception of change, and the difference in the incidence 
of running out of food prior to and while on income 
management – for a range of population subgroups. 
This chart, as well as documenting the discrepancy, 
also showed how the change in actual outcomes for 
these subgroups related to the control populations 
(Bray et al. 2012a:195–196). Explicit in this discussion 
was a differentiation between what were described as 
‘perceived’ and ‘actual’ changes. Given this, it is difficult 
to see the choice to report only the perception rather than 
the actual as being other than a deliberate attempt to 
misrepresent findings.
The second half of the ministerial statement relates to 
the possibility that the program ‘may make a contribution 
to improving the wellbeing of some’, but omits the 
substance of the preceding paragraph in the report, 
which read:
The evidence gathered to date for this evaluation 
suggests that NIM has had a diverse set of impacts. 
For some it has been positive, for others negative and 
for others it has had little impact. Taken as a whole 
there is not strong evidence that, at this stage, the 
program has had a major impact on outcomes overall. 
Although many individuals report some gains, others 
report more negative effects. (Bray et al. 2012:xxiii)
The departmental material in the ‘fact’ sheet, as well 
as not having been updated to account for the final 
report, again refers to the perception of running out of 
food, but also adds perceived improvements in child 
outcomes. Again, the evaluation drew attention to the 
lack of consistency between these perceived child 
outcomes and the actual changes in areas such as 
school attendance. In doing so, the report also indicated 
that this type of discrepancy had been found in previous 
research, stating: 
For example, the NTER evaluation found that 
participants in NTER communities had much 
more positive views about the effects of the NTER 
in relation to factors such as school attendance 
than were actually reflected in the rates of school 
attendance. (Bray et al. 2012:196) 
The NIM evaluation report further considered this in 
analysis of its own survey findings, looking at data on 
changes in school attendance, as published by the 
Northern Territory Government, and again emphasised 
the ‘considerable gap between perceptions and actual 
change’ (Bray et al. 2012:214). This discrepancy, with 
respect to individual and child wellbeing, was then 
specifically addressed, and the report stated: 
Indigenous people subject to income management 
… reported strong perceptions of improvements … 
cautions need to be exercised in interpreting these 
findings … such perceptions are not confirmed by 
objective data where it is possible to test this. (Bray 
et al. 2012:255)
As such, not only are these references by the then 
minister and the department highly selective, but the 
specific results cited were in fact heavily qualified in the 
report, with the report, in particular, highlighting that 
they appeared to be implausible in the light of the other 
evidence which was examined. 
Government reporting of the findings of the 
Place-Based Income Management and APY 
Lands evaluations
In response to the short-term Place-Based Income 
Management and final APY Lands evaluation reports, 
which were released in 2014, the then Minister, Kevin 
Andrews, presented the findings in his press release as:
Mr Andrews said the reports show income 
management is helping individuals and families to 
better budget and stabilise their lives.
‘The reports found that the vast majority of people 
who volunteered for income management were 
positive about the initiative, reporting lower stress 
levels and marked improvements in their ability to 
manage their money.
‘In addition, those on voluntary income management 
reported they had reduced their use of substances 
such as alcohol and in the APY Lands there were 
also improvements reported in child well-being’. 
(Andrews 2014b)
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Notable in this presentation is that only the results of 
the Place-Based Income Management evaluation with 
regard to those on the voluntary measure were cited, 
not the results for the overwhelming majority who are 
on compulsory measures. While the Place-Based 
Income Management evaluation did report some positive 
outcomes for those on Voluntary Income Management, 
as discussed previously, the evaluators clearly reported 
that these were not replicated in the study for those on 
the compulsory measure.
The media release also addresses the APY Lands 
study. The presentation of the ‘finding’ with respect to 
a reduction in substance abuse needs to be weighed 
against the actual text of the report, which was ‘Overall 
there is mixed evidence at this stage for the effect of 
income management on substance misuse and gambling, 
with different community members having different 
views and perceptions’ (Katz & Bates 2014:38). Nor is 
the optimistic cast of the minister’s language tempered 
by other findings such as ‘the survey found high levels 
of deprivation in the community, with over 70 per cent of 
participants saying that they had run out of money in the 
past four weeks’ (Katz & Bates 2014:21). 
A second reference to the APY Lands evaluation in the 
minister’s media release concerns child outcomes. Here 
the minister says there were ‘improvements reported in 
child well-being’. The data presented in the report were 
much more ambiguous on this:
… the majority of participants were non-committal 
about changes in child wellbeing. Of those who did 
respond, most felt there had been no change. Very 
few felt that the changes had been negative. (Katz & 
Bates 2014:33) 
The evaluation further indicated: 
These findings should all be considered in the 
light of the methodology for this project, which is 
primarily based on the views of community members 
… therefore the findings are not able to provide 
indications of changes in overall community wellbeing 
resulting from the implementation of income 
management through outcome measures such as 
school attendance, child health assessments, child 
protection notifications, crime rates, or changes in 
spending patterns. (Katz & Bates 2014:42)
On the Department of Social Services webpage ‘Income 
management evaluations’, the final findings of the Deloitte 
evaluation of Place-Based Income Management are 
summarised as:
The Consolidated Place Based Income Management 
Evaluation Report shows that improved financial 
management, the reduction of harassment and abuse 
relating to welfare payments, confidence in saving 
and spending, and improved housing stability were 
the most positive outcomes for people participating 
in Placed Based Income Management. (DSS 2016b)
What this summary omits to say is that the quoted results 
relate solely to the findings for the 22.3% of the Place-
Based Income Management population who had chosen 
to go onto Voluntary Income Management, and were 
not the findings of the research for the overwhelming 
majority, 77.7%, who were on one form or another 
of compulsory income management. The marked 
differences the evaluation found with regard to these 
two groups of participants were made very clear in the 
summary of the report, which noted: 
For VIM customers, PBIM appeared to have a 
positive impact on their capability to better save and 
spend their money … VULN-AT did not demonstrate 
a significant improvement in their capability or 
confidence in saving or spending their money. 
(Deloitte 2015b:ii–iii)55
The evaluation further indicates, as has been referenced 
earlier, that, across all components – that is, both 
compulsory and voluntary – ‘the longitudinal survey did 
not find sustained, significant impacts on self-reports 
of smoking, drinking or gambling habits across any of 
the measures’ (Deloitte 2015b:56). As indicated earlier, 
a recommendation from this study was to remove the 
automatic triggers for compulsory income management 
and to simply maintain a voluntary stream and a tightly 
targeted compulsory element, based on individual 
assessment and ‘exceptional circumstances’.
What is clear from the cases is that the selective use of 
the findings of these evaluations would appear to be a 
deliberate process. 
5.1.3 Why has this occurred?
It could be suggested that the government reference to 
the ‘inconsistency’ of the NIM evaluation findings was just 
a cynical attempt to discredit the study.56 Alternatively, it 
can be seen as a symptom of a more pervasive problem 
in government with regard to evidence, programs 
and policies. This is that there is a strong imperative 
on ensuring that any policy that a government has 
introduced or endorsed is seen as being successful. This 
lends itself to a ‘cherry picking’ approach to the results 
of evaluations, one which stresses any positives and 
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supportive findings, and either ignores or rationalises 
away any qualifications, or indeed negative findings. 
While this can be seen as just being astute ‘political’ 
management – ensuring that government programs are 
seen as being successful – the ongoing implementation 
of these policies, and indeed their expansion, despite 
evaluation findings, suggest that a deeper process 
may be occurring. This could take several forms. The 
first is simply a belief in the policy at a theoretical or 
conceptual level. That is, governments, and indeed 
some departments, hold a deep-seated belief in a 
simple intuition such as ’if you control the way in which 
people spend their money, this will prevent them 
spending the money in an unwise manner’. Or a belief 
that all of the problems experienced by some groups 
is as a consequence of their bad behaviours – such as 
consuming alcohol and tobacco – and hence, if you limit 
this bad behaviour, all of the problems will be resolved. 
Such beliefs in simple narratives, if firmly held, may not 
be amenable to the demands of evidence. This approach 
can be almost conceived of as ‘faith-based policy’, in 
that rational evidence is not required and indeed can 
be ignored.57 
An alternative approach is that of ‘group think’. In this 
case, there is a similar starting point – an initial belief in 
the policy being right because the origin of the decision 
was made by ‘moral people’ behaving in a ‘moral way’. 
In this explanation, a more subtle process tends to lock 
in the policy – and ignore the evidence. This approach, 
as identified by Janis (1973), sees decisions becoming 
detached from the actual real circumstances through 
a range of processes, including a belief in the inherent 
morality of the group, self-censorship and the emergence 
of self-appointed mind guards who ‘protect the group 
from adverse information’ (Janis 1973:22). Although this 
approach was specifically developed in the context 
of small group decision making, especially in times of 
crisis, it may equally apply to decision making within 
government around income management. 
5.2 Limitations of the program 
evaluation approach
Before concluding this review of the evidence from 
the evaluations of income management, there is value 
in considering what such evaluations fail to do. This 
has already been alluded to in the comments from 
Malezer (2013) regarding the tendency for the outcomes 
measured in evaluations to be framed from government 
and mainstream non-Indigenous perspectives rather than 
the priorities and needs of Indigenous people themselves, 
as well as the Altman and Russell (2012) paper. 
Associated with this, as is more generally recognised in 
the evaluation literature, is the narrowness of program 
evaluation which is solely concerned with what has 
happened against the objectives of the program. This 
danger was emphasised by Stufflebeam (2001): 
The objectives-based approach is especially 
applicable in assessing tightly focused projects that 
have clear, supportable objectives. Even then, such 
studies can be strengthened by judging project 
objectives against the intended beneficiaries’ 
assessed needs, searching for side effects, and 
studying the process as well as the outcomes. 
(Stufflebeam 2001:17) 
A wider criticism is from Ahlenius, the former Auditor-
General of the Swedish National Audit Office: 
‘Focusing only on the easier part of it – that is, internal 
efficiency/productivity — is dangerous, as it may 
result in ever better performance of the wrong tasks’ 
(Ahlenius 1997:82).
5.2.1 NIM, and community priorities and aspirations
While the NIM evaluation was undertaken in a classical 
program evaluation framework and was focused on 
answering specific questions about the program 
outcomes relative to the program objectives, this wider 
concern was addressed in an epilogue chapter to the 
final report (Bray et al. 2014a:Chapter 16). This chapter 
arose from the final community feedback discussions 
held by the evaluation team with a number of the 
communities which had participated in the evaluation. 
The report noted: 
In reporting back on the evaluation to communities, 
peak organisations and others it became obvious 
that, while many people were interested in the impact 
that the program was having – and often had strong 
views on the measure – income management was not 
seen as being the key to obtaining change and that 
there were many other issues that they considered 
to be more important to improving outcomes and 
they wanted their views on these communicated. 
(Bray et al. 2014a:326)
Specific issues raised included better employment 
opportunities within communities; addressing housing, 
especially overcrowding; education; and persistently ‘the 
need for policies to be built up at the community level 
and implemented by communities’ (Bray et al. 2014a:327). 
In this context, although income management was an 
issue, it was not seen as being the priority for achieving 
better outcomes.
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5.3 Conclusion
Since its introduction in 2007, income management, 
and the range of more specific initiatives implemented 
in different locations, has been subject to a substantial 
number of evaluations. The nature of these evaluations, 
the forms of income management they relate to and the 
findings of the evaluations have varied. Notwithstanding 
this, there are some clear themes which emerge from 
these studies:
• In all but the place-based initiatives, the 
program has disproportionately impacted on 
Indigenous Australians.
• There are mixed views about the program from those 
who are subject to the measure and those working 
with them or involved in the implementation.
• Those studies which utilise objective or repeated 
measures of outcomes, such as consumption, 
financial behaviours and school attendance, generally 
find little, if any, evidence of changes associated 
with the program. In contrast, questions around 
perceptions of change are much more frequently 
answered positively (although far from universally so).
• To the degree that there have been any impacts on 
outcomes, these are associated with people who 
have chosen to go onto the program – that is, those 
who participate in Voluntary Income Management. 
In contrast, there is no evidence of such impacts 
for those placed on widespread compulsory 
income management.
• The evidence base on the much smaller, highly 
targeted compulsory programs is less substantive 
and, on balance, has been more reliant on qualitative 
information. There are grounds from the evaluations 
to consider that these programs may have a beneficial 
impact where the individuals are motivated to 
make changes, and where they are supported by 
caseworkers and other interventions. In other cases, 
the evidence suggests that, where people wish to, 
they work around the restrictions imposed on them.
• There are recurrent concerns across many of the 
evaluations that the program is leading to increased 
dependence on the welfare system rather than 
fostering independence. Specific measures to 
improve financial capability, such as the matched 
savings grant, have been a failure.
In this context, claims that the findings of the NIM 
evaluation were inconsistent with other studies appear 
to be misplaced. Indeed, the major findings of a lack of 
positive improvements for those subject to widespread 
compulsory income management appear to be strongly 
buttressed with the subsequent findings of the evaluation 
of Place-Based Income Management.
It appears rather that the claims of inconsistency 
arise from a range of other factors. One is a desire to 
cherry pick results to ‘prove’ program success. This 
has operated through three mechanisms. First, simply 
choosing and portraying selected, and indeed contested, 
results as being absolute, with no concern about 
any qualification placed on these, their consistency, 
actual impact, or indeed the existence of contradictory 
evidence. Second, failing to take account of the different 
implementations of income management, especially not 
differentiating the outcomes of voluntary from broadly 
targeted compulsory programs. Third, relying on reported 
perceptions of change, rather than actual measurement 
of change and outcomes. 
While this might just be a case of political expediency in 
presenting results, the persistence of this conduct, and 
the absence of any substantive policy changes despite 
the findings of multiple evaluations, point to a more 
concerning situation where the level of commitment to the 
program – within both some elements of government and 
the bureaucracy – has resulted in a process of rejection 
of ideas contrary to their belief in the program, with this 
becoming self-perpetuating.
A major gap in the evaluations is the absence of any 
measure of cost-effectiveness. In the case of the NIM 
evaluation, the department said it was unable to provide 
data on the actual costs. Nevertheless, account needs to 
be taken of direct costs of some $5000 per person per 
year for marginal, if any, changes in outcomes.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the top-down imposition 
of the policy not only is likely to have detracted 
significantly from any potential positive outcomes the 
initiative might have had, but has also acted to further 
marginalise groups, including Indigenous Australians, 
and has deprived communities of the opportunity to 
participate in building solutions to the problems that 
they see as being their priorities. This question has 
not been strongly focused on in evaluations, which 
have rather been structured to address specific 
questions related to program implementation and 
program-specific outcomes.
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Notes
1.  In this paper, it should be noted that the terminology 
‘Compulsory Income Management’ is largely restricted to 
references to the Long Term Welfare Payment Recipient and 
Disengaged Youth streams of New Income Management 
in the Northern Territory, whereas ‘compulsory income 
management’, or the ‘compulsory measures’ relate to all 
of the measures that may be imposed on a person – that 
is, all forms other than Voluntary Income Management. 
As, however, much of the material here directly references 
other studies which may use this language differently, the 
terminology is not necessarily always consistently used.
2.  In the case of NIM, most (86.5% in December 2013) 
voluntary participants had previously been subject to 
compulsory income management under the NTER. While 
the first NIM evaluation report found some indications that 
the ‘choice’ they made to move onto Voluntary Income 
Management may not have been fully informed (Bray et al. 
2012:257), the evidence suggests that most participants, 
after having been on income management for periods of up 
to six years, seek to remain on the program, in large part 
because it is ‘easier being income managed’ (Bray et al. 
2014a:260–261).
3. While there have been long-standing policies under which 
a person may have a nominee who receives income 
support payments on their behalf and who is responsible 
for spending these funds for the person’s benefit, this is a 
distinctly different mechanism and is implemented only at 
a person’s behest, or in association with a guardianship or 
similar statutory arrangement.
4.  Similar approaches are used in a number of countries, 
with varying degrees of targeting and control. In the UK, 
an ‘Azure Card’ is issued to some asylum seekers; in 
addition to direct housing assistance, it is the sole means 
of support provided to them. The Azure Card, introduced 
in 2009, is a prepaid card, mainly able to be used at major 
retailers, which cannot be used either to withdraw cash, 
or to purchase alcohol, tobacco, vehicle fuel, or store or 
gift cards (Santo 2014). A limited evaluation of the card in 
2014 by researchers in the British Red Cross concluded 
that this arrangement ‘does not allow refused asylum 
seekers to meet their basic needs and live with dignity. It 
creates unnecessary suffering for people who are already in 
desperate situations’ (Carnet et al. 2014:8). New Zealand has 
introduced Money Management across a number of youth 
payments. Under this program, young people are limited to 
a cash amount up to $50 per week, with the balance of their 
income support being redirected to living costs and debt 
repayment through direct payments made on their behalf, 
or through a payment card. The range of items that can be 
purchased on this card is limited and includes:
… food and grocery items; public transport passes; pre-
paid power cards; education and training related items, 
eg stationery; health care related items, eg medication 
costs; basic clothing, eg socks; basic appliances, 
eg electric jug; and basic household items, eg plates/
plastic food containers. (MSD 2015a)
Excluded items include ‘alcohol, tobacco, appliances and 
electronics’. In discussing policy options, the Ministry of 
Social Development (MSD), while indicating that the broader 
Youth Service approach, of which money management is 
part, was an effective and, in the long term, cost-efficient 
policy, noted more specifically that ‘money management 
is an expensive intervention’ (MSD 2015b:18) and 
‘money management becomes less beneficial as clients 
become older’ (MSD 2015b:29). It supported targeting 
the extended measure only to those at risk. (See also 
Fletcher et al. [2013].) 
In the United States, assistance under the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as 
Food Stamps, is delivered at the state level through a range 
of mechanisms, including debit cards. The funds cannot be 
used for the purchase of:
… alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, hot food 
and any food sold for on-premises consumption. Non-
food items such as pet foods, soaps, paper products, 
medicines and vitamins, household supplies, grooming 
items, and cosmetics. (USDA 2015)
5. The evaluation and key findings are also discussed in 
Bray et al. (2015)
6. The reference to ‘some’ evidence was a qualification 
reflecting that the subpopulations on the two highly targeted 
measures – child protection and assessed vulnerable 
– were very small, and, in drawing this conclusion, the 
evaluation was largely reliant on qualitative data collected 
from intermediaries. As discussed later, intermediaries are 
people, such as Centrelink officers and community workers, 
who are either associated with implementing the program or 
working with those affected by it.
7. Over the period March 2015 to March 2016, the total number 
of people being income managed increased by 3.3%, 
mainly as a result of 9.5% growth in the number on the Long 
Term Welfare Payment Recipient measure, which is part of 
income management in the Northern Territory. The number 
of people on Voluntary Income Management fell 7.0%. There 
also appears to have been a fall of just over 20% in the 
number of people on Child Protection Income Management; 
however, this is an estimate because the detailed data have 
not been published.
8. These criteria include the composition of store sales – with 
the main business being the sale of priority goods and less 
than half of sales being of excluded products – along with 
record keeping and other obligations.
9. Centrelink is the agency within the Australian Government 
Department of Human Services responsible for the 
administration of income support and other related 
payments, and the implementation of income management.
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10. In the 2015–16 Budget, it was announced that this payment 
was to be phased out as part of streamlining the operation 
of income management, on the basis that it was one of the 
‘underutilised parts of the services’ (DSS 2015b). There 
appears to be no explanation by the department of the basis 
on which they consider the payment to be ‘underutilised’, 
although DSS has previously reported that, as of 27 March 
2015, 41 535 Voluntary Incentive Payments had been made 
over the life of the program to 9525 people (DSS 2015a).
11. The Northern Territory Emergency Response policies were 
identified by the Australian Government as a response to 
the ‘Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle [Little Children are 
Sacred] (Wild & Anderson 2007) report.
12. Data for March 2016 show that 159 people in the Northern 
Territory in the vulnerable stream of income management 
had been assessed by a social worker and 431 had been 
automatically placed under the youth measure. In the rest of 
Australia, the numbers are 91 and 2191, respectively (DSS 
2016a).
13. Details of the approach used to derive the exemption rate 
are provided in the NIM evaluation (Bray et al. 2014a:96–97). 
Data for March 2016 (DSS 2016a) indicate that the 
overall exemption rate in the Northern Territory has fallen 
from 10.2% in December 2013 to 9.4% in March 2016. 
It would appear that the exemption rate has fallen for both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.
14. See also Macklin (2008).
15. Other automatic triggers include being under 16 years and 
receiving Special Benefit, or receiving Crisis Payment on 
release from prison.
16. Income management in Ceduna has been suspended for 
a 12-month period from March 2016 due to the trial of the 
cashless debit card.
17. In August 2016, the program was only operating in two 
sites: Ceduna in South Australia, and the Kununurra and 
Wyndham region in Western Australia. No statistics appear 
to have been published on the number of people placed on 
the measure, but it would appear that the number will be 
well below the level of the cap.
18. This cashless debit card is different to the BasicsCard. The 
key difference is that, while the BasicsCard is only able to 
be used at approved merchants who need to meet a range 
of criteria including the proportion of sales on goods defined 
as ‘basics’, and where the stores manually limit the sales of 
items such as tobacco, the cashless debit card is proposed 
to be able to be used at all usual outlets using the EFTPOS 
system, other than those selling alcohol or gambling 
services, and cannot be used for cash withdrawals.
19. See Katz & Bray (2015) for a discussion of some of the 
issues associated with this evaluation. It is further noted that 
while the government commitment was that:
… there will be a detailed evaluation process which will 
be undertaken. It will be an independent evaluation, and 
by and large we will be tracking the main harm indicators 
in the community as well as taking some qualitative 
assessments (Tudge 2015),
 no detailed evaluation plan appears to have been released, 
and ORIMA Research, the organisation contracted to 
conduct the evaluation, simply describes the task as: 
The aim of the project is to collect information on the 
experiences of Trial participants, of their families, and of 
people living in those communities over the 12 months of 
the Trial. (ORIMA Research 2016)
20. The original aspirational objective introduced into the 
legislation was ‘to promote socially responsible behaviour, 
particularly in relation to the care and education of children’ 
(Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare 
Payment Reform) Act 2007 [assented to 17 August 2007]). 
This was subsequently amended in the Social Security 
and Other Legislation Amendment [Welfare Reform and 
Reinstatement of the Racial Discrimination Act] Act 2010 
(assented to 29 June 2010) to the form cited here.
21. For the same reasons, this paper does not cover 
more general academic and related papers on income 
management. These include O’Mara (2010), Sanders (2010), 
Billings (2010, 2011), Cox (2011), Buckmaster & Ey (2012), 
Coghlan (2012), Buckmaster (2013), Dee (2013), Mendes 
(2013) and Mendes et al. (2014).
22. Ideally, control groups should be obtained from the random 
assignment of people to either a treatment or a control 
population. For these studies, however, control populations 
have been selected from populations in locations not 
subject to the program. Under this approach, especially 
where the focus is on the treatment group rather than the 
intention to treat population, it is more difficult to obtain 
an equivalent population, especially where there are more 
detailed and individualised selection criteria, and elements 
of self-selection such as in the case of Voluntary Income 
Management. To the extent that these evaluations focused 
on changes in behaviours, and outcomes were expected to 
be more prevalent in the treated population, the direction 
of any bias introduced by this selection effect is likely to be 
towards an overstatement of positive change.
23. It is also possible that these findings point to attribution bias. 
Specifically, when people were surveyed, they were aware 
that the questions were related to income management and 
this may have triggered a tendency for them to provide an 
explanation for changes in the context of the narrative of 
income management that has been provided to them. (That 
is, when people are placed on the program, and in the array 
of program marketing material, they are told that income 
management will improve their capacity to care for children, 
purchase food, etc.) In a population with some random 
variation in the capacity to achieve these outcomes over 
time (e.g. due to exogenous income shocks or expenditure 
demands), there is likely to be a tendency to causally 
attribute the random events consistent with the narrative 
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to the program, while ignoring the inconsistent ones. This 
process of asymmetrical reporting leads to a biased pattern 
of responses.
24. In the AIHW report, both studies are listed as ‘unpublished 
report prepared for Department of Families, Housing, 
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra’ 
(AIHW 2010:87).
25. While the program is described as being highly targeted, the 
Queensland Parliamentary Review (Ruthenberg 2014) notes, 
for example, that it found ‘in the first three years of the Trial, 
half of the adult population in the participating communities 
had direct contact with the FRC for breaching at least one 
social obligation’ (Ruthenberg 2014:15).
26. It appears that the consultation with stakeholders 
was directed at what may be considered to be direct 
intermediaries involved in administering the program. That 
is, it involved DHS staff, and staff employed by public 
housing authorities and child protection agencies, in 
addition to retailers. There seems to be little indication that 
the evaluation sought broader views from the community 
sector. In addition to collecting qualitative data, some 
quantitative data were collected from some stakeholders.
27. It would appear from the evaluation report that, while the 
researchers had a longitudinal data collection, the analysis 
of change treated each of the waves as independent 
cross-sections. The evaluation does not appear to discuss 
the reasons for this methodology, or the impact of attrition 
across waves of the survey, nor does it appear that account 
was taken of when some participants may have exited the 
program and hence the effective ‘treatment time’ of income 
management. In addition, it is not entirely clear in the report 
the extent to which some of the reported effects are within 
group, or relative to the control population.
28. This program is part of the mix of income management 
programs in some locations. It involves people assessed 
as being vulnerable by Centrelink social workers and young 
persons receiving some specific forms of income support.
29. This refers to young people placed on income management 
as a result of the automatic triggers related to payment type, 
relative to those placed on income management following a 
social work assessment.
30. A further issue is that this reporting also appears to ignore 
the actual classification of priority needs and simply seeks 
to redefine all non-excluded purchases as ‘priority needs’. 
This is not correct. Priority needs are detailed in legislation 
(Social Security [Administration] Act 1999, s 123TH) and 
related regulations. These are quite prescriptive. For 
example, in the Guide to social security law, priority goods 
are defined to include ‘toys (that are educational, this 
does not include electronic toys)’. Similarly, the definition 
specifies that only ‘basic personal hygiene items’ are 
permitted, and limits the purchase, repair and use of 
motor vehicles and bicycles to situations where these are 
used for education, training, accessing health services, 
funerals and employment, and, while identifying fixed 
line telephones, it does not include mobiles (Australian 
Government 2015:section 11.1.3.50, ‘Priority needs under 
income management’).
31. The report is ‘A critique of the published statistical analysis 
in a study by the Menzies School of Medical Research, 
August 2010’ by DSI Consulting Pty Ltd. It does not appear 
to be available from the DSS website, and most references 
to it appear to be citations from government documents. 
Altman & Russell (2012) describe it as unpublished.
32. These are stores in remote Indigenous communities. In 
many cases, the stores have a local monopoly.
33. The review was headed by Andrew Forrest, and the report 
of the review is in his name. The documentation of the 
review does not present a clear picture of the review’s 
structure. The then prime minister, in releasing the report, 
cites as ‘members’ of the team ‘Professor Marcia Langton 
and my Parliamentary Secretary, the Hon Alan Tudge, MP’ 
(Abbott 2014). In view of this membership, it is not entirely 
clear whether this should be considered as an independent 
report or as one shaped by the government’s position on 
these matters.
34. The proposal was that the entirety of all transfer payments, 
other than the Age Pension and veterans’ payments, would 
be made available through an EFTPOS card that would be 
blocked to prevent its use to withdraw cash or purchase 
alcohol, gambling, illicit services and gift cards, at the point 
of sale.
35. Members of the Reference Group were Mr Patrick McClure 
AO (chair), Ms Sally Sinclair and Mr Wesley Aird.
36. The commissioner noted that because of time constraints 
the consultation did not include input from the APY Lands 
and Maralinga Tjarutja communities. Although this meant 
that there was no feedback on the experience of income 
management in the APY Lands, as noted in the discussion, 
the consultations did include people in the Ceduna area 
who provided input based on their experience of the 
implementation there.
37. The small number of non-Indigenous people on Voluntary 
Income Management meant that this population could not 
be separately analysed; the program population was treated 
as a whole.
38. This pattern of responses raises further questions that an 
evaluation needs to consider. Is the variation in responses 
from the different communities simply a consequence of the 
small samples of participants in these locations who were 
asked and is simply sampling variability? Alternatively, does 
it reflect different biases in community views or a differential 
impact of the program in locations? If it is the latter, why 
are there these different impacts from a uniformly applied 
program – and what are the implications of this actual 
effectiveness of the program? In contrast to the cited results 
from the NIM evaluation, this variability does not appear to 
be a reflection of the different circumstances of people living 
in urban areas relative to communities, because the data 
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used in the AIHW study relate to three remote communities 
and town camps in a regional town.
39. In writing more broadly about the impact of the Intervention 
and the Closing the Gap initiative, Waterford reflected on the 
use and interpretation of this type of subjective measure of 
improvement as an indicator of program outcomes:
There was some slight progress on a few of the Closing 
the Gap targets, and, in a few places, subjective feelings 
(as often as not by providers rather than recipients of the 
love) that things were now marginally better than they 
had been before. But what does it mean if 30 per cent 
think things are better? (Waterford 2014)
40. See discussion in endnote 30 on the restrictive nature of 
goods identified as responding to ‘priority needs’.
41. It appears that, since this point was raised at a conference, 
DSS has further reduced the amount of information in its 
2014–15 annual report relating to income management 
and no longer makes such a claim. This further reduction 
in information in the annual report and other departmental 
material suggests a further retreat from the commitment 
made by DSS to the Auditor-General to improve the 
performance reporting framework.
42. The report indicates that 55.7% of respondents reported 
reduced spending on tobacco while 34.3% said the 
question was not applicable (AIHW 2010:43), implying they 
were nonsmokers.
43. Here it should also be noted that income management was 
not the only policy or program in place that sought to reduce 
tobacco consumption.
44. The study documents the reasons why this finding cannot 
be simply ascribed to the differential consumption patterns 
of low-income households.
45. It is recognised that these measures are indicators rather 
than direct measures of financial capability and good financial 
management. Essentially, the intuition behind the approach 
is that if a person is showing good financial management 
they will be aware of their resources and will not usually have 
a transaction fail because they have insufficient funds to 
cover it. Similarly, good financial practice is to be protective 
of transaction cards; although loss or theft can occur, action 
to minimise this and the effectiveness of this protection 
will increase with better management skills. In the case of 
minimum balances, prudent financial management would 
suggest value in keeping some funds in reserve to meet 
unexpected costs, or at least to minimise the time without 
such a fall-back. Given this characteristic, the evaluation 
placed emphasis on using multiple indicators to provide an 
insight into trends in financial management capability, rather 
than reliance on a single measure. The concept of financial 
capability is not simple to measure – for example, Kempson et 
al. (2013) propose a 30- to 40-minute survey to measure it in 
developing and middle-income countries.
46. The program has been terminated as part of the 2015–16 
Budget measures.
47. Personal identification number – the confidential code used 
to confirm a transaction.
48. The evaluation looked at the outcomes for three groups: 
Indigenous people on compulsory forms of income 
management, Indigenous people on Voluntary Income 
Management and non-Indigenous people on compulsory 
measures. This approach reflected the use of separate 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous control populations in 
the study.
49. The problem of financial harassment is one mainly 
associated with Indigenous communities, where it often 
involves a perverse form of traditional sharing arrangements. 
No change was identified for non-Indigenous people on 
compulsory income management.
50. While these outcomes are in many cases still self-reports, 
to the extent that there are either systematic biases in 
respondent reports, or more general trends which will 
impact on both respondents and the control population, this 
approach will tend to minimise the degree to which these 
factors may distort the analysis.
51. Personal report from a researcher to the author.
52. These probabilities are derived from modelling presented in 
the evaluation report. Characteristics included in the model 
included gender, age, partner status, age of youngest child, 
the socioeconomic status of locations, duration on income 
support and number of children.
53. Title as listed on website; actual document titled ‘Income 
management evaluation and review’.
54. The document appears to have been removed from the 
website in early 2016. This may be associated with the 
provision of an early draft of this paper to a parliamentary 
committee in late 2015.
55. In the report, Deloitte further indicated that, with respect 
to the Voluntary Income Management population, 
‘Analysis confirmed that this change could be attributed 
to participation in the PBIM program as a commensurate 
change was not observed for comparator respondents’ 
(Deloitte 2015b:ii). This causal attribution needs careful 
attention given that there appears to be no attempt in 
Deloitte’s analysis to control for the clear selection effect 
that is a consequence of self-selection into the program. 
Rather the methodology, as reported, cannot differentiate 
between whether the difference is simply a result of the 
different motivation and characteristics of those who self-
select, whether the program provided these participants 
with tools they could use for better management or 
whether the program imposed external constraints on 
their behaviour. Given the small proportion of the potential 
target population who self-selected into Voluntary Income 
Management in the PBIM sites, in contrast to the NIM 
evaluation, this is a major methodological constraint.
56. Such an interpretation is suggested by Altman and Russell 
(2012), who present five observations based on the 
evaluations of the NTER and government responses to these 
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– these include: ‘Observation 3: Controlling evaluations’ 
to minimise the risk of adverse findings and ‘Observation 
4: Discrediting evaluations’. In their discussion under this 
latter observation, they review the treatment of research by 
Brimblecombe et al. (2010).
57. This type of approach also allows for reliance on some 
illustrative examples, or indeed parables, which serve to 
demonstrate the narrative. This can be seen, for example, in 
the use of views in ‘some communities …’ as indicative, and 
privileging selective qualitative data and individual narratives 
over more systematic quantitative results.
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